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ABSTRACT 
 
 After surveying the literature on the normativity of logic, the paper answers that 
logic is normative for reasoning and rationality.  The paper then goes on to discuss 
whether this constitutes a new problem in issues in normativity, and the paper affirms 
that it does.  Finally, the paper concludes by explaining that the logic as model view can 
address this new problem. 
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Issues in the Normativity of Logic and the Logic as Model View 
§1: Introduction  
What was the charge that Plato and Socrates levied against to sophists?  Simply put, it’s 
that they, “made the weaker argument appear the stronger?”  Surprisingly, this charge was 
brought against Socrates in his trial.  How can one substantiate such claims?  Philosophers would 
come to believe that logic—Aristotle’s Organon—is the tool for evaluating arguments.  That is, 
Aristotle’s works on logic, for their breath, rigor, and insight would become near orthodoxy for 
centuries to come.  I say near orthodoxy both because they were often considered to have 
exhausted the field and because they were required texts for any student of philosophy.   
Modern logic has abandoned Aristotle’s logic (or, often, any logic) as orthodox, but there 
remains a sentiment that one can hardly imagine abandoning.  Namely, the necessity of adhering 
one’s argument to and its being assessed by the standards of logic.  Students of philosophy are 
still required to learn logic, and we evaluate our peer’s arguments with the tools of logic.  If we 
find that his argument has violated a rule of logic, we can inform him or another about the fault.  
When a peer is unmoved by our charge, we clarify, eliminate potential misunderstandings, try to 
locate the source of disagreement, or reassess the dialectic (is my peer even offering an 
argument?).  Finally, one may conclude that our peer is not arguing rationally, at least not in this 
case.   
Despite there being various alternatives, one we find hard to accept is that logic must not 
have anything to do with our assessment of our peer’s argument.  In essence, we find it difficult 
to deny that logic has a normative role in argument.  A well-known objection to this point is 
found in Harman’s book, Change in View1.  He argues that good reasoning doesn’t always 
                                                 
1 Harman, Gilbert. Change in View. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1986. 
  
2 
follow the logical notions of consequence and consistency.   I will go into further detail in section 
two2. 
Harman’s reflections have inspired two main questions in the literature.  Does logic have 
a normative component?  And if so, what is it?  I will argue that it does, but I won’t answer the 
second question.  Nevertheless, I will justify leaving this unanswered.  My purposes for taking a 
position in this area is to address another question.  It is known that there are philosophical 
problems concerning normativity.  There’s the metaphysical problem of accounting for 
normativity in a natural world and the epistemological problem of how we come to know 
normative truths.  What I am asking is, “does the normativity of logic constitute a different 
problem?”  A few things are required to answer this question.  First, we must understand the 
metaphysical and epistemological problems thoroughly enough to be able to distinguish them 
from other problems.  Secondly, we must establish that logic is normative.  I take on the first task 
in the remainder of this section.  Section two will be devoted to establishing that logic is 
normative.  Section three will explain what this different problem is.  Finally, section four will be 
an attempted solution.                
To begin, let’s survey the known issues in normativity well enough to distinguish them 
from the different problem—the one I will introduce in section three.  First is the epistemological 
problem.  A classic formulation of this problem is found in Benacerraf’s Mathematical Truth.3  
His account focus solely on mathematical truth, but what he says about it applies to normative 
                                                 
2 Harman distinguishes ‘argument’ and ‘reasoning,’ but I think the above sentiment also applies 
to reasoning.   
3 Benacerraf, Paul. Mathematical truth. Journal of Philosophy, 70, (1973): 661–679.  
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truth, so I shall summarize his views and apply them.  Benacerraf observes that we need a 
philosophical theory that includes a semantical and epistemological theory of mathematics.  By a 
semantical theory, Benacerraf means a theory that accounts for the truth of mathematical 
statements, and by “accounts,” he just means that it specifies the truth conditions of 
mathematical statements.  By an epistemological theory, he means a theory of how we come to 
know mathematical truths.  He notes that a philosophical account that brings together these 
theories will do two things.  First, the semantical account must provide the truth conditions for 
all those statements that we take to be true.  Secondly, the semantical theory must not make it 
such that it is impossible for us to have any mathematical knowledge whatsoever.  It could be 
that there are some unknowable mathematical truths, but at least some mathematical truths must 
be knowable.  
Benacerraf’s thesis is that the desired philosophical accounts tend to forfeit one condition 
by meeting the other.  For example, on the standard account the truth, statements referring to 
physical kinds such as “there is a dog outside” are true iff there is a dog outside.  Applied to 
mathematical statements, “there are prime numbers” is true iff there are prime numbers.  If we 
use the same account of truth, then this, he suggests, implies Platonism.   In such a case, we 
would not have mathematical knowledge.  This is because for X to have knowledge of S, X must 
have an “appropriate” causal connection with S.  Whatever an appropriate causal connection 
amounts to, it will not be a relation we can bear to mathematical objects in this platonic sense 
because they are casually effete.  Another option is to give what he calls “combinatorial” or 
“syntactical” truth conditions, where to be a true mathematical statement just is to be part of a 
proof.  Since proofs are things mathematicians can do, this accounts for mathematical 
knowledge.  But Benacerraf is left unsatisfied, “I wonder… what such a sprinkling of the word 
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‘true’ would accomplish.”4  He points out that merely postulating a system of rules is insufficient 
for mathematical truth, for those axioms could be inconsistent.  Even if consistency is achieved, 
truth may not be, for consider the game of chess.  It is a system of rules, but we don’t regard a 
valid move as truth preserving.  In summary, Benacerraf’s worry is accounting for both the truths 
of mathematics and our knowledge of it.   
I think the epistemological worries surrounding normativity can be categorized along the 
same lines.  We only need to replace “mathematical truth” with “normative truth” and the above 
argument flows just as well.  We need an account that a) accounts for all the true normative 
statements and b) allows for the possibility for us to come to know some normative truths.  Let’s 
consider one case.  Suppose, for the sake argument, that what an agent should do is a function of 
his reasons for action.  Thus, an agent should do what he has decisive reason to do.  What, then, 
does he have reason to do?  Normative desire theory provides one answer: an agent has a reason 
to do that which would fulfill his desires.  Construed this way, desire theory functions as a 
semantical theory in that it tells us which normative statements are true.  Namely, the true 
statements are those imperatives that tell an agent to act in such a way as to fulfill his desires.  
However well it fulfills the first condition, it fails to meet the second.  How do we come to know 
the truth of the statements stipulated by a normative desire theory?  Normative facts don’t seem 
to be the sort of thing that can stand in an “appropriate” causal relation to agents.  And hence we 
have a Benacerraf-style worry.  Perhaps this can be resolved by appealing to reductive desire 
theory, where an agent’s reason for action is identical, the very same thing as, the agent’s desire.  
This fulfills the second criterion since knowing our desires is something agents with functioning 
cognitive faculties could do, at least partially.  But again, this condition is achieved at the 
                                                 
4 Ibid, 677 
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expense of the other, for then it seems that the normative facts have been eliminated.  What 
explains an agent’s action becomes a psychological fact, and this leaves open the question of 
whether acting on a desire is the right thing to do.  Thus, I take it that Benacerraf’s worries about 
mathematical truth carry over into the issues of normativity.   
Next on our list is a summary of the metaphysical problem.  As Mackie (1991) famously 
put it, “If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations of a 
very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.”5 (p. 38).  This has come to 
be known as “the placement problem.”  It stems from the fact that normative facts don’t seem to 
fit in, or a find a place, within the realm of natural facts.  Why don’t they fit in?  Objects in our 
usual experience, such as tables and chairs, fit in because they are amendable to experience and 
scientific investigation, which implies their causal relations, physical properties, and objectivity.  
In short, they are of the same ontological category, whereas moral properties would not be.   
Mackie goes on to wonder about the relation between a natural kind—causing pain for 
fun—and its moral quality—wrongfulness.  He is puzzled because their relation is not one of 
semantic entailment, yet it cannot be that they are coincidentally related; otherwise, it wouldn’t 
be an objective property.  He further questions how the two can be related by a relation of 
supervenience.  As a naturalist, unable to deal with the placement problem, supervenience 
problem, and epistemological problem, Mackie writes in what reads more like poetic yearning 
than philosophical argument: “How much simpler and more comprehensible the situation would 
be if we could replace the moral quality with some sort of subjective response which could be 
causally related to the detection of the natural features on which the supposed quality is said to 
                                                 
5 Mackie, J. L. Inventing Right and Wrong. New York. Penguin Group, 38. 
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be consequential.”6  The objectivity of moral values presents a metaphysical problem for 
Mackie.  Feeling the force of an either-or situation, Mackie does not give up naturalism and 
instead seeks to give up moral objectivity.  These are rather interesting philosophical issues.  
However, I want to see if the normativity of logic presents a different issue—one different from 
the ones considered so far.  Before doing that, however, I have to answer the more basic question 
of whether logic plays a normative role.        
§2. A Romp Through the Normativity of Logic: Harman and the Normativity of Logic. 
Is logic normative for reasoning?  Many take it that Harman argued that deductive logic 
has no normative relation to reasoning.  Indeed, Macfarlane (unpublished),7 Field (2009),8 and 
Steinberger9 (unpublished)—some of Harman’s main commentators—go through painstaking 
detail responding to Harman and showing how logic can be normative.  I take their positions to 
be defensible, but I do so for a surprising and simpler reason: Harman never intended his 
arguments to show that logic plays no normative role in reasoning.  Moreover, even if someone 
intends to use Harman-esque arguments to call into question the normativity of logic, such 
objections only provide defeasible reason.  There are less hasty conclusions one could draw from 
them—conclusions consistent with logic playing some normative role in reasoning.  This will 
confirm my main thesis that Harman-esque objections are insufficient to conclude that logic 
plays no normative role in our reasoning.  
                                                 
6 Ibid, 41 
7 Macfarlane, John. In What Sense (if any) is Logic normative for Thought? Unpublished. 
8 Field, Hartry, What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society  
 Supplementary Volume, 83(1), 251-268 
9 Steinberger, Florian. Three Ways in Which Logic Might be Normative. Unpublished.  
https://floriansteinberger.weebly.com/uploads/5/7/9/5/57957573/three_ways_jp.pdf 
(2017) 
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 The first claim I want to defend is that Harman never intended his arguments to show that 
logic has no normative role in reasoning.  To accomplish this, I start by summarizing his view.  
Then, I illustrate how some of his main commentators have interpreted him.  Finally, I bring out 
inadequacies in their interpretation of Harman as arguing that logic has no normative role.  
Meanwhile, I argue for an interpretation of Harman consistent with logic playing some 
normative role—thus making his objections insufficient to conclude that logic plays no 
normative role in our reasoning.  To clarify, I am only critiquing the interpretation of Harman’s 
commentators.  I won’t be assessing the commentator’s main arguments for logic having a 
normative role.  I include their views only because their interpretations have had a significantly 
influence on the literature concerning logic and normativity.  So, let us begin.    
Harman identifies reasoning with a change in view.  He begins by asking whether 
“…logic has some special relevance to the theory of reasoning.”10  He concludes that, “it turns 
out that logic is not of any special relevance.”11  He observes that if logic is going to be specially 
relevant to reasoning, then it must be via the principles of implication and inconsistency.  But 
neither of these is without exception.  He then proceeds to explain.  First, rational agents do not 
have to follow all the rules of implication.  Mary believes that if she looks in the cupboard, then 
she will see cheerios.  Mary also believes that she is looking in the cupboard, but she doesn’t see 
Cheerios.  However, Mary should not conclude via modus ponens that she is seeing Cheerios.  
We can make the same point differently.  It is a fact about logical implication that a true 
statement can be formed by any true statement, the “or” disjunct, and some other statement.  
Thus, Mary’s true belief, B, implies a plethora of beliefs, most of which are useless.  These are 
                                                 
10 Ibid., 11 
11 Ibid., 11 
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beliefs such as “B or unseen wild elephants wear pajamas.”  Similarly, “B or toys have an active 
life when we are not looking.”  And the list goes on and on.  It would be irrational for Mary to 
follow all the implications of her beliefs.  A third way to make the same point is that one is 
reasonably expected to not believe all the consequences of her beliefs if doing so is overly 
demanding.  For instance, one may believe the axioms of Peano’s arithmetic, but the average 
person is not held accountable for not proving theorems based on the axioms he believes.  Thus, 
it seems that there are exceptions between rules about logical consequence and rules of rational 
agency.   
Those observations are about implication.  What about inconsistency?  It turns out that 
sometimes rational agents are permitted to hold inconsistent beliefs.  In the preface paradox, one 
is imagined having written a non-fiction book.  Imagine further that each claim in the book was 
thoroughly examined to the best of the author’s ability to assess the evidence.  However, despite 
his great caution, the author realizes that probably not all the claims are true since he is fallible.  
Thus, he believes all the claims in the book, meanwhile believing that at least one of them is not 
true.  It seems that although believing each of his claims is contradictory to his belief that he 
must be mistaken about one of them, the author is within his rational rights to believe each of the 
claims, especially because he gathered much evidence for them.  Thus, as with implication, rules 
of logical consistency do not necessarily prescribe rules about reasoning.  Harman’s conclusion 
is that logic and reasoning are not specially related12. 
That completes the summary of Harman.  Next, we shall look at how his commentators 
have understood him.  I mentioned at the outset that I wouldn’t be responding to their main 
                                                 
12 contemporary treatments of this problem appeal to some probability theory to avoid 
contradiction.  I think they are on the right track, but in this first section, I am only interpreting 
Harman. 
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arguments, only their interpretations of Harman.  Nevertheless, to understand their interpretation 
of Harman, I must bring up their main arguments.  This means that laying out the argument of 
Harman’s commentators is important, but I ask the reader to keep in mind that I bring them up 
for my interpretive project only.  So, how do they respond?  In a sentence, Macfarlane, Field, and 
Steinberger respond by developing bridge principles that solve the worries that Harman presents 
as well as other related worries13.  This sort of response to Harman is one that Harman, in the 
same chapter, anticipated, though he did not use the word, “bridge principle.”  However, it seems 
to have gained traction as an objection through an unpublished—though highly read and 
esteemed—paper from Macfarlane (unpublished).  Here, Macfarlane takes on the project of 
clarifying the sense in which logic may be said to be normative—as is plain from the title, In 
What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?  Harman is thus absorbed into the 
discussion because the points he makes—i.e., those already discussed—show that the 
relationship between logic and rationality is not straightforward.   
I take it as obvious that Harman’s objections do bring out the need to clarify what the 
connection is, but I do not take it as obvious that this was Harman’s main purpose, yet already 
we can begin seeing him being interpreted in such a way.  In my above interpretation of Harman, 
I tried to mimic something he did.  Namely, he ubiquitously used “special” in his doubts about 
the relation between logic and reasoning.  To doubt that there is a special relation between logic 
and reasoning is quite different from doubting that it has a normative role, or a straight forward 
one.  I am not saying that Macfarlane endorses these latter interpretations, but I am saying that a 
                                                 
13 Field, for example, worries about how there could be a rational change in logic, and how to 
epistemically evaluate those who reason according to different logics.   
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reader of his paper can come away with them.  As we continue, I am going show that this 
interpretation is misguided.   
Macfarlane goes on to discuss that to spell out a normative connection between the two 
disciplines, we need something that satisfies the following:  
Bridge Principles:  If A, B |= C, then (normative claims about believing A, B, and C)14   
The idea here is that the antecedent will contain some fact about logical consequence, which we 
can call the “triggering condition15.” In the parenthesis, we should put in a normative claim.  An 
obviously faulty example is “If A and B entail C, then one ought to believe C.”  This is not 
immune to Harman’s criticisms, but I leave it here as an example of a bridge principle.  
Macfarlane continues to classify types of bridge principles and concludes that there are eighteen 
possible arrangements that the consequent can take.  He argues for two such principles, which I 
will not discuss here.  But the hope, then, is that with enough tinkering, one can come up with a 
bridge principle that will be immune to Harman’s objections.  Interpreting Harman as 
challenging the existence of such a principle would mean that finding the principle constitutes a 
response to Harman.  Thus, Macfarlane sets the stage of the debate for the next contender. 
 Despite correctly introducing his view, Field develops the dialectic of his paper as 
responding to the incorrect view—that Harman takes there to be no viable bridge principle.  That 
is, Field goes through painstaking detail to develop such a principle and show how it is immune 
to Harman’s criticisms, as well as other related criticisms.  Here is how he starts off on the same 
                                                 
14 Macfarlane, John. In What Sense (if any) is Logic normative for Thought? Unpublished, 6. 
15 Steinberger’s terminology 
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topic as Harman and subtly slides away.  “What is the connection between (deductive) logic and 
rationality16” (p. 252), he asks.  And he continues:     
… Harman has cited a large number of obstacles to there being a close connection 
between logic and rationality, and has argued that logic has no more of a connection to 
rationality than any other important discipline does…Rational people will try to have the 
right views about this, but they will try to have the right views about physics and 
sociology too, so there is no more essential tie between logic and rationality than between 
physics or sociology and rationality.17  
Here, Field is engaging with Harman’s question—what is the connection between logic and 
rationality?  Furthermore, he correctly identifies his view as there being nothing special about 
such connection.  Harman never compares the relationship between rationality and logic as akin 
to that between rationality and other sciences.  But without an explanation of what he meant by 
“specially relevant,” it’s hard to see what else Harman could have meant.  Objects that are 
special are special in comparison to other objects.  So, if we are wondering what makes logic 
“special,” compared to science, then it must be its normative role.  The rest of Harman’s chapter 
showing how logic is not always normative can understandably be interpreted as him claiming 
that logic does not have this role and hence not specially related to reasoning.  Nevertheless, this 
comparison of logic and science in their relation to reasoning is foreign to Harman’s paper.  Its 
imported to make sense of his demand for “special relevance.”  It’s a small difference that 
determines whether Field is truly responding to Harman.  
Whereas Macfarlane takes the challenge to be that of clarifying the relation between the 
disciplines, and Field takes it to be that of showing that there is such a relation, Steinberger 
offers a hybrid between these two: “logic… is normative for reasoning.  Famously, the tradition 
                                                 
16 Field, Hartry, What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume, 83(1), (2009): 252 
17 Ibid., 251-252 
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was challenged by Gilbert Harman who argued that there is no straightforward connection 
between logical consequence and norms of reasoning.”18  The issue begins with the use of, 
“straightforward.”  It suggests that the connection is simply unclear, and spelling it out will 
satisfy Harman.  This is in line with Macfarlane.  But the quote could also mean that there exists 
no connection, and “straightforward” serves to relax the claim: maybe there is an occasional 
connection, but nothing significant.  This latter interpretation is closer to Field’s because it 
suggests that the appropriate response to Harman is to present a viable bridge principle.  What 
the authors do have in common is a reliance on bridge principles as a means of replying to 
Harman.  Would a bridge principle, as ‘straightforward’ as it may be, truly be an answer to 
Harman’s skeptical worry?  How and in what way would it constitute such a special connection?  
I think Macfarlane, Field, and Steinberger all have in mind that with this principle, one can show 
that logic has a normative role, and assuming that nothing else plays this role, then this role must 
be special.   
 What I take to be significantly telling is that in his reply to Field, Harman (2009) did not 
object that the principle is not ‘straight forward,’ nor did he attempt to find faults in applying it 
to reasoning.  Steinberger does an excellent job at clarifying the exchange by introducing 
different ways logic can be normative: via evaluations, directives, and appraisals.  Steinberger 
suggests that Harman and Field might be talking past one another.  Yet Harman’s reply to Field 
never mentions whether Field and he are talking across purposes.  What is his reply to Field’s 
bridge principle?  It is that they agree.  “Far from disagreeing with any of this, Field (2009) 
eventually proposes basically the same thing. Where I appeal to recognized implication and 
                                                 
18 Steinberger, Florian. Three Ways in Which Logic Might be Normative. Unpublished, 1. 
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psychologically immediate implication, he initially appeals to obvious entailment and degrees of 
belief.”19  If we are to understand Harman’s challenge as doubting that there is no bridge 
principle, or as doubting that there is a straightforward way in which logic is normative, or that 
logic simply does not have a normative role, then this response should be puzzling.  Why, once 
given a bridge principle specifying a normative role between logic and reasoning does he not 
object?  We can make sense of his response if we do not interpret his challenge as his 
commentators have.  
The difficulty that now confronts us is, “what else could he have meant by ‘specially 
relevant?”  A couple of his comments, scattered throughout the first two chapters, prove useful.  
First, in chapter one, Harman notes that he is unclear whether he is looking for a normative or a 
descriptive theory of reasoning, and he mentions that the distinction may not be sharp.  Secondly, 
in chapter two, he considers a bridge principle, “Recognized Implication Principle: One has a 
reason to believe P if one recognizes that P is logically implied by one’s view.”20  However, he 
still has scruples because the scope of application would be limited to people who have concepts 
of classical logic—concepts such as logical implication and inconsistency.  One of the examples 
he gives is that the statement “today is Saturday” implies “tomorrow is Sunday,” and the 
statements “X or Y” and “not Y” imply X.  Although these are ways that we actually reason, 
only the latter is an implication in the classical sense.  So, he revises the bridge principle by 
                                                 
19 Harman, Gilbert. Field on the Normative Role of Logic. Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society,109, 334 
 
20 Harman, Gilbert. Change in View. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 18. 
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deleting “logically.”  Harman believes that the modified principle is preferable since it captures 
classical as well as non-classical implications—such as a days-of-the-week logic.   
Next, why would he take the second principle to be an improvement?  It isn’t because it 
has more normative force in the sense of demanding more of an agent21, nor is it because it is 
more straightforward.  They seem to be equal in these respects.  It must be because the second 
one describes more cases.  For Harman, it is not enough for logic to have a normative role for it 
to be special.  It must have it in a rich, broad, and more encompassing sense.  His main 
complaint is that deductive logic will not be “exception less.”  The aforementioned authors 
understand this to challenge the existence of a normative role.  It could equally and alternatively 
challenge its universality or its descriptivity.  We have already seen that, regarding the latter (i.e., 
descriptivity and normativity), Harman draws no sharp distinction.  Given these comments and 
his reply to Field, I conclude that the interpretations that paint Harman as saying that there is no 
normative role for logic to play are inadequate.  Harman is questioning whether standard 
reasoners employ classical logical rules as norms, not whether there is any normative role for 
logic to play. 
Before making a transition in this section, I want to respond to a potential objection22 to 
my argument.  The objection begins by pointing out that Harman could have easily proven that 
deductive logic isn’t identical to reasoning/rationality or that it isn’t a complete theory of 
reasoning/rationality.  Namely, by pointing to cases of inductive reasoning, such as inference to 
the best explanation.  Harman does not do this, and one may wonder why he didn’t.  Doing so 
                                                 
21 Although, the revised principle might have more normative force in the sense that it has a 
wider scope, i.e., it applies to more agents.  Preferring the principle for this reason confirms my 
main point, which is coming up.   
22 Thanks to Shyam Nair for pointing this objection out.   
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would have put him in a very rhetorically persuasive position.  The view that interprets Harman 
as merely saying that logic is not identical to reasoning has no clear answer to this question.  
However, on the view that interprets Harman as arguing that logic is not normative, there is a 
clear answer.  Namely, to show that deductive logic is not normative for reasoning, one needs 
specifically to appeal to cases where such logic does not apply to reasoning. 
Now, I am not entirely sure how pressing this objection is for my view.  I don’t think 
Harman was entirely clear as to what he took the problem to be, so the question seems to demand 
precision that it not there, but let’s consider what he says in another, related paper.  This will be 
for the interpretative task only and I will not endorse the conclusions he arrives at. 
In a 2002 paper,23 Harman explicitly argues for a view that is in line with what I have 
been saying here.  This becomes evident as soon as one reads the title, “Internal Critique: A 
Logic is not a Theory of Reasoning and a Theory of Reasoning is not a Logic.”  In a section of 
this paper, Harman notes that many misleadingly talk about two types of reasoning: inductive 
and deductive, where the only difference is one type always preserves truth.  In contrast to this, 
Harman points out that the rules of deduction are just rules that a proof must satisfy to be a proof, 
not rules one must follow in some temporal order.  He continues.  When reasoning, one could 
accept a conclusion because one has constructed a proof for that conclusion.  However, one 
could have started off believing the conclusion and then looked at what assumptions account for 
it.  Thus, “…the conclusion that one accepts might be a premise of the proof;” He concludes that 
                                                 
23 Harman, Gilbert. Internal critique: A logic is not a theory of reasoning and a theory of  
 reasoning is not a logic. Vol 2. 2002: 171-186 
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“the connection between proofs and reasoning is… complex.” 24   Harman then turns to a 
discussion of induction and basically makes the same complaint:  
The conclusion of an argument is not to be identified with the conclusion of reasoning in 
the sense of what you end up with or “conclude” as the result of your reasoning.  Even 
when reasoning culminates in the construction of an argument, the conclusion of the 
argument may be something one started off believing, and the conclusion of one’s 
reasoning may be to accept something that is a premise of an explanatory argument 
constructed as the result of inference to the best explanation.25   
 
Harman is saying that “deduction and induction are not two kinds of reasoning; they are not two 
kinds of anything.”26 (p. 177).  He means that they are not reasoning insofar as reasoning doesn’t 
follow the pattern of deductive or inductive rules.  So, when the objector above asks why didn’t 
Harman appeal to cases of inductive reasoning if all he was saying is that logic is not a theory of 
rationality, I can respond that, in a way, he does.  He says induction ‘on the model of deduction’ 
isn’t reasoning either.  Yet Harman believes this is consistent with saying that we can reason 
inductively: “…it would be stupid, indeed highly irrational, not to engage in inductive 
reasoning.”27 I wish Harman would have explained more.  He did not.  But here is what is clear.  
Harman is saying that deduction in not a theory of rationality, and insofar as induction is 
construed on the model of deduction, it neither is a theory of rationality/reasoning.  However, 
‘inductive reasoning,’ whatever he thinks that is, is reasoning.  Thus, the demand of the objector 
that Harman appeal to inductive forms of reasoning is met because Harman implicitly appeals to 
cases of inductive reasoning that are not “on the model of deductive reasoning.”  This all might 
be a bit vague, but that is the best I could do given the information available to me. 
                                                 
24 Ibid., 179 
25 Ibid., 179 
26 Ibid., 177 
27 Ibid., 179 
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 If the ambiguity leaves one unconvinced, then consider Harman’s clearest endorsement 
of the way I am interpreting him: “It is true that deductions, proofs, and arguments do seem 
relevant to reasoning.  It is not just that you sometimes reason about deduction in the way you 
reason about your finances or where to go on your summer trip.  It’s an interesting and nontrivial 
problem to say just how deductions are relevant to reasoning…”28  Clearly, these aren’t the 
words of a person who thinks there is no connection between logic and rationality.  At most, he 
is saying that the connection isn’t clear, or that he isn’t clear about it.  But I’ve already argued 
that this can’t be all he is saying, for when Field presented a straightforward bridge principle, 
Harman’s response was that they agree, and he did not say that the principle was unclear.  
Interpreted correctly, Harman’s view that rational agents do not reason in complete accordance 
with deductive logic is consistent with saying that deductive logic can have some normative 
significance for reasoning.         
            §2.1 Can Harman-esque Worries Lead to Normative Skepticism?     
Harman’s worries aren’t sufficient to say logic has no normative role in reasoning.  I have 
argued that the reason for this is simple: Harman didn’t intend to argue for this.  But what if 
someone did?  Then, they’d be offering a Harman-esque worry29.  In such a case, we may ask 
what sort of objection is a Harman-esque objection?  It is an exception to a general rule, such as 
logical rules give us rules of reasoning.  A Harman-esque argument objects to something such as 
the following: “Fs give us Gs.”  Here, the Fs refer to logical facts.  The Gs refer to normative 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 178 
29 By “Harman-esque,” I mean an objection to thinking that there is a connection between logic 
and rationality.  The “esque” is added because the objection begins with observations of the kind 
that Harman made but it drives towards the conclusion that, I have argued, Harman did not, i.e., 
that there is no connection between logic and rationality/reasoning.    
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claims.  And one fills in how they relate.  Merely for purposes of illustration, we could fill in “Fs 
give us Gs” with, “the laws of logic (Fs) give us (the relation) the laws of correct reasoning 
(Gs).”  A Harman-esque worry presents us with situations where logical rules do not prescribe 
rules of reasoning.  Schematically, it presents Fs that do not give us Gs.  If so, then what should 
our conclusion be?  Here is one option: Fs and Gs are unrelated.  
However, this conclusion is too hasty.  First, in science, predictions are not always 
correct and predictions for all phenomena are not always expected, yet the theories are still 
rationally held.  In the latter case, a Newtonian physics won’t be able to predict the exact 
trajectory of a falling feather in the Grand Canyon given certain atmospheric conditions, 
although it could model it imprecisely.  In the former case, where scientific predictions aren’t 
always correct, theories often admit of predictive failures.  The predictions of Newtonian 
Mechanics failed to account for the orbit of Hayley’s comet, but scientists didn’t thereby discard 
the theory.30  Thus, failed predictions—such as Fs without Gs—do not necessarily imply the 
rational abandonment of a theory.  Of course, failed predictions point towards a need for a better 
theory.  Relativity best explained the orbit of Hayley.  But it is only when a competing theory 
solves a problem that one is rationally moved to switch one’s previous theory.  Following the 
norms of scientific rationality, Harman-esque worries don’t guarantee the rationality of claiming 
that logical rules and rules of rationality are completely unrelated. Sometimes, imperfect theories 
are rationality held.  And such imperfections contain most weight only in light of a theory that 
improves these imperfections.           
                                                 
30 Weinberg, Steven. Dreams of a final theory (1st ed.). New York: Pantheon Books. (1992). 
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Even in light of a new theory, it does not follow that there will be no relation between Fs 
and Gs.  In a less hasty conclusion, one can nuance the “Fs” or the “Gs.”  We can say that “Fs1, 
but not Fs2, give us Gs.”  Or, “Fs give us Gs1 but not Gs2.”  For example, the fact that A implies 
B is not an obligation to believe B on the basis of A, say because the implication is very 
complicated.  Yet we can be more nuanced: the implication is a rational requirement when one 
has noticed it.  I don’t mean to endorse this or any other schema as immune to Harman-esque 
criticisms.  I just wish to show that even given such objections, there are other conclusions one 
could draw.   
Finally, instead of nuancing the relatum (the Fs and Gs), one could nuance the relata 
(predicts/gives/ect…).  From a Harman-esque scenario, one could conclude that Fs 
“probabilistically” relate to Gs.  This is how some theories in the social sciences function, for 
example: crime is a result of poverty.  Such a theory can be rationally held even though not all 
victims of poverty are criminals.  Similarly, we can admit that the relation between rules of logic 
and reasoning is probabilistic, or admitting of exceptions.  
§2.2 Is Logic Normative?   
  Thus far, I have argued that neither Harman nor Harman-esque objections are sufficient 
to conclude that logic and reasoning/rationality bear no normative relation to each other.  So, is 
logic normative for reasoning?  I endorse the affirmative, but I have not argued for it per se.  
This is because it is prima facie justified that logic plays a normative role in reasoning and 
rationality.  Historically, logic has been understood to have normative force.  This is not the 
fallacy from tradition, for it is scholars in logic who have historically attested to this.  
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Steinberger31 and Field interpret Frege32 as believing that the laws of logic are the laws of 
thought.  Or consider other logicians.  “…all rational inquiry depends on logic…” write Barker-
plummer, Barwise, and Etchemendy.33  I’ve said that this is not a fallacy from tradition.  Neither 
is it a fallacy from authority.  The fallacy from authority is committed when a statement is said to 
be true solely in virtue of one’s authority or when the authority’s credentials do not put him or 
her in an epistemically relevant position although they are presented as doing so.  But appeal to 
authority is warranted when the authority in question is pertinent to the subject matter.  In this 
case, I believe that the testimony of logicians regarding what their trade is should be given some 
cognitive weight, even if this doesn’t constitute the final say on the matter.  And so, it seems to 
me that the burden of proof would lie on the claimant arguing that deductive logic does not have 
a normative role in reasoning/rationality. 
One could object as follows.  Since none of the principles delineating a normative role for 
logic have worked, then why think there is one?  At this point, it seems a mere promise to say 
that logic is normative.  So, you need a plausible principle delineating logic’s normative role to 
know that logic is normative.  I think there are three things wrong with this objection.  First, 
philosophy is hard and it is not easy to come up with uncontroversial principles in any of its 
domains.  This domain is no exception.  The problem might just be due to limitations of human 
ingenuity.   
Secondly, from the fact that there is no consensus on which principle best captures moral 
facts rarely do we conclude that there are no principles governing moral facts.  The parallel 
                                                 
31 Steinberger, Florian. Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic. Synthese, 194(1), 143-162. 
32 I must disclose that what Frege means is a matter of contention.   
33 Barker-Plummer, et al. Language Proof and Logic. United States. CSLI Publications. (2011). 
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situation is that from a lack of consensus, one shouldn’t necessarily conclude there is no 
principle relating logic to rationality.  Two rejoinders come to mind.  The first rejoinder says that 
there are clear cases in ethics whereas, given Harman-esque objections, there aren’t equally clear 
cases of logic’s normative relation.  But this rejoinder confuses clear cases of principles with 
clear cases of particulars.  There are obviously clear particular cases of moral facts, such as 
pointing out a particular murder as wrong.  However, when pressed for an uncontroversial 
principle, it’s hard to develop one.  It might be that we do use some principle to identify the 
particular case, but it will be controversial once its pressed for philosophical rigor.  Similarly, 
there are clear cases of logic playing a role in reasoning.  My favorite case comes from a former 
professor of mine:  If it is Jack in the Box, then it sells tacos.  It is Jack in the Box.  Therefore, it 
sells tacos.  Just like in the ethics case, when pressed for a principle that captures these cases, it’s 
hard to come up with one.  So, what the advocate of the first joinder needs to show is that there 
are clear cases of ethical principles and not equally clear cases of principles relating logic to 
rationality.  I can’t imagine someone showing this.  The second rejoinder argues that ethical 
disagreement is often taken as a reason for moral skepticism or relativism.  In the same way, 
disagreement regarding the connection between logic and rationality should be a reason for 
skepticism or relativism in this domain.  My initial reply to this rejoinder is to repeat myself.  
First, philosophy is a difficult endeavor and a lack of consensus shouldn’t be enough to say there 
are no truths in the disputed domain.  Secondly, and relatedly, the disagreement regards which 
principles capture normative judgements.  The disagreement isn’t, typically, that there are no 
principled ways of capturing our judgments.  Of course, one could believe that there are no moral 
facts and no facts concerning rationality and hence no principled way of accounting for them, but 
this would just be to not play the game.   
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Thirdly, and finally, I think this response begs the question against what I have argued 
regarding Harman’s position and his style of objections.  Namely, I argued that this was never 
his position and that Harman-esque objections are insufficient to establish that there is no 
normative connection between logic and rationality.          
I’d like to close by putting together everything I’ve argued for here.  We saw that various 
authors take Harman to have challenged the existence of a connection between logic and 
rationality.  However, I argued that he never intended to say this.  Moreover, I argued that any 
argument that uses his observations to establish that there is no normative relation between logic 
and rationality is an incomplete argument.  Lastly, I hold that, prima facie, logic is normatively 
related to reasoning/rationality.  The failure of us to say exactly how it relates is not surprising 
and not a decisive reason to doubt that there is such a connection.  Philosophy is difficult and we 
don’t give up just because we have failed various times.  For all these reasons, I believe that 
logic does play a normative role in reasoning/rationality.  The next task is to ask whether this 
normativity in logic constitutes a different problem. 
§3 Why think there is a unique problem? 
 In this section, I will explain why I think the normativity of logic constitutes a new 
problem.  I would like to compare my view with Reppert’s argument from reason.  My main 
reason for discussing his argument is that the problem he points to can be thought of as a new 
problem.  Comparing his view to my view on why the normativity of logic is a distinct problem 
serves to put the advantages of my view in perspective.  I will argue that the difference gained on 
Reppert’s view is one of degree rather than of kind while on my view, the difference is one of 
kind.  Let me begin with Reppert’s view. 
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Reppert’s argument34 from reason can be described as a family of arguments that, 
“…attempt… to show that the necessary conditions of logical and mathematical reasoning, 
which undergird the natural sciences… require the rejection of all broadly materialist 
worldviews.”  In this section, I only wish to interact with the version of the argument termed, 
“the argument from the psychological relevance of logical laws.”35 (p. 379).  This version of the 
argument attempts to show that materialism cannot account for rationality, and materialism 
should thus be abandoned. 
 By materialism36, Reppert means the claims that the universe is 1) mechanistic 2) 
causally closed and 3) such that anything non-physical must supervene on the physical.  Now, on 
materialism, all that is explanatorily relevant to our behavior is the initial physical conditions and 
the scientific laws.  “Concluding” is part of our behavior.  So, it follows that all that is needed to 
explain our inference-behavior is provided by initial physical conditions and scientific laws.  But 
now the problem arises.  To be rational, we must be governed by the laws of logic.  Yet, 
according to materialism, we are not governed by logical laws—only physical ones.  Thus, on 
materialism, the laws of logic do not govern our rational inferences.  And if the laws of logic do 
not govern our rational inferences, then we are not rational.  But clearly, we are rational, at least 
sometimes.  So materialism must be false. 
                                                 
34 Reppert, Victor. The Argument from Reason. In The Blackwell Companion to Natural  
Theology (pp. 344-390). Edited by  Craig, William. Oxford, UK: Wiley‐Blackwell, 344. 
 
35 Ibid., 379 
36 In this section, I use naturalism and materialism interchangeably, and I think this is consistent 
with Reppert’s use: “…materialistic will encompass all doctrines, that one could plausibly call 
naturalistic” (p. 345, 2009).  
  
24 
   Assessing this argument requires understanding what Reppert means by “governed” by 
the laws of logic.  The bad news is that an explanation is not forthcoming in his writing, but the 
good news is that we can continue without said assessment.  We only need to ask in what sense 
this could constitute a new problem.  Reppert believes there is something special about this 
argument in that it has a transcendental nature.  That is, if the naturalist responds with an error 
theory (or an eliminative strategy), then the naturalist undermines his own view because he 
would not be able to say his naturalism ought to be believed.  But in what sense, if any, would 
this be a new problem?  One common way of objecting to naturalistic worldviews is by showing 
that there are some phenomena that naturalism cannot explain.  To illustrate, in Mind and 
Cosmos, Nagel37 rejects naturalism since it can’t account for moral values, and Pereboom,38 in 
Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, notes that the knowledge argument presents 
one of the strongest challenges to physicalism—a version of materialism.  Such a challenge 
involves a knowledge gap, and hence an explanatory gap, between physical facts and first person 
qualitative facts.  Reppert believes that his argument is specially pressing since it puts the 
naturalist in a special predicament, one where the naturalist can’t use the standard responses.  To 
better understand this predicament, consider the types of responses that a naturalist can employ 
when presented with some allegedly unexplainable phenomena (and hence a problem).   
Reppert writes that typically the naturalist has three types of responses when presented 
with unexplainable phenomena.  First, error replies or eliminitivist replies can be used to show 
that there really isn’t anything to explain.  Pereboom argues that Mary could be mistaken about 
                                                 
37 Nagel, Thomas, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature              
is Almost Certainly False. Oxford University Press, (2011).  
38 Pereboom, Derk, Consciousness and the prospects of physicalism (Philosophy of mind series).  
 New York: Oxford University Press 
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her qualitative experiences and hence she doesn’t come to know a fact.  A naturalist can respond 
to Nagel that there really aren’t any moral facts, or that we are systematically mistaken about 
them.  Secondly, reconciliatory responses aim to naturalistically accommodate the controversial 
phenomena.  Physicalists can reduce mental kinds to natural kinds.  Scanlon39 argues both for the 
irreducibility and naturalistic acceptability of reasons.  Finally, naturalists can use inadequacy 
objections.  These replies aim to show that the problematic phenomena are equally problematic 
on the alternative views.  A naturalist can accept the difficulty of explaining objective moral 
values on naturalism but argue that they are equally problematic on theism, say because of the 
Euthyphro dilemma.  
On Reppert’s view, the argument from reason is distinct from other issues in normativity 
for the naturalist in that it, on pain of irrationality, robs the naturalist of error type rejoinders.  
Reppert is asking the naturalist how the laws of logic are relevant to our reasoning behavior.  
Identifying the laws of logic with those of rationality, he says that if the naturalist claims that 
there are no laws or that we are systematically mistaken, then this would undermine the rational 
credibility of any worldview, naturalism included.  Now, I take it that this argument isn’t 
particularly pressing because we don’t know exactly what it means for logic to guide our 
reasoning behavior and because he identifies the laws of logic with the laws of rationality.  
Regarding the latter point, Reppert is mistaken.  It’s not the laws of logic but the laws of 
rationality that must govern rational agents, and so stated, Reppert’s problem never even takes 
off and hence does not count as a new problem.  Reppert may respond by changing “governed by 
logic” to “governed by rational laws” and argue that this is still unexplained on materialism.  So 
construed, his problem, even if it is a problem, wouldn’t be a case of the normativity of logic 
                                                 
39 Scanlon, Thomas. Being Realistic About Reasons. New York: Oxford University Press. 2013 
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constituting a problem, which is not what I am looking for.  But for purposes of argument, I want 
to grant him that the laws of logic are the laws of rationality.  After all, this was a position that 
Frege40, 41 adhered to. As much as possible, I want to set these issues aside to focus on the main 
problem that Reppert is driving at.   
The main problem is that, on materialism, we can never come in appropriate causal 
contact with the laws of logic.  And if we don’t have this appropriate contact—what Reppert 
calls governed by the laws of logic—then we can’t be rational.  I come to this interpretation 
because of Reppert’s emphasis that the physical laws and conditions are the only viable 
explanations given materialism.  But if this is the issue, then it is very much like Benacerraf’s 
issue.  Recall that the challenge was to come up with a philosophical theory that specified the 
truth conditions for mathematics, meanwhile allowing for one to have knowledge of these truths.  
Knowledge, for Benacerraf, is in terms of an appropriate causal connection, so if one postulated 
mathematical truth conditions in terms of causally effete platonic objects, then one was unable to 
know these mathematical truths.  Similarly, Reppert is saying that since, on materialism, we 
cannot have this appropriate causal connection to logic, then we cannot be rational.  But then, to 
add that Reppert’s argument restricts the rejoinders available to the materialist is not to make it a 
new problem, although it might make the problem a more pressing.  In conclusion, whatever the 
merits of Reppert’s arguments may be, they do not point to a different problem concerning the 
normativity of logic. 
§3.1 A Problem from the Autonomy of Logic and Normativity 
                                                 
40 Steinberger, Florian. Frege and Carnap on the normativity of logic. Synthese, 194(1), (2017)  
 
41 Field, Hartry, What is the Normative Role of Logic? Aristotelian Society  
 Supplementary Volume, 83(1), (2009) 
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Consider logical objects, such as the valid forms of classical logic, existing in a robust 
platonic sense.  Such objects would be timeless, space less, immaterial, and causally effete.  A 
problem the Platonist faces is explaining how we come in contact with such objects.  This is the 
epistemological worry, which is intensified by the metaphysical worry of how there can be such 
objects.  Now, Harman taught us that there is a distinction between reasoning/rationality and 
logic, so a Platonist has a third issue.  Why are these logical objects related to rationality?  This 
is what I shall call the problem from the autonomy of logic and rationality.  It also translates into 
a general problem for anyone who believes that logic plays a normative role in reasoning or 
rationality.  Such a person has to answer, “why are there logical facts that relate to facts of 
rationality?”  Let me expand on this issue.   
The lesson that we learned from Harman is that logic and reasoning are autonomous 
disciplines.  They are autonomous in that the standards of correctness are independent of each 
other.  Correct thinking in one domain doesn’t imply correct thinking in the other domain.  A 
logical implication licensed by modus ponens, for example, is not necessarily licensed for a 
rational agent.  And an agent in a preface paradox is licensed to hold inconsistent beliefs even if 
inconsistency isn’t licensed by some deductive logical system.  Perhaps the case could be made 
that for every piece of reasoning that we call “good,” there is a corresponding piece of logic to 
justify it.  However, it would still remain that not all the rules of logic always license reasoning.   
Now, “autonomy” is in terms of independence, so let’s clarify this concept.  Scanlon 
distinguishes two senses of “independence.”  Judgment-independence occurs when one can be 
mistaken about claims in a domain.  This is true of mathematics, but it is also true when 
discussing fiction.  Choice-independence, on the other hand, is a combination of judgment-
independence plus standards of correctness that “…do not depend on what we, collectively, have 
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done, chosen, or adopted, and would not be different had we done, chosen, or adopted something 
else.”42  To say that the standards of correctness in logic are choice independent of the standards 
of correctness in rationality is to say that they obtain irrespective of our legislative practices on 
the matter.  If the disciplines are choice independent in this sense and if logic relates normatively 
to rationality, then this relation must be explained and thus is a problem.  But choice 
independence assumes realism, so if there is a problem here, we can ask whether it can be 
averted by giving up realism.  I will briefly take up this question prior to continuing to expand on 
the problem I am raising here.        
On Reynold’s43 characterization of realism, the realist claims that the disputed claims are 
as they are reported to be.  An antirealist claims that the statements are true only according to 
that area of discourse.  An antirealist about Harry Potter characters believes that statements such 
as “wizards fly on brooms” is true only according to the story, and a realist about such characters 
believes that this is how things are, i.e., the statement is true not just according to the story but in 
the world too.  Similarly, a realist about logical truths believes that this is how things are, but an 
antirealist believes the truths of logic are true only according to the logical “narrative” we have 
developed.  Since these logical narratives are up to us to develop, then the antirealist does not 
believe that logic has choice independence, although it does have judgement-independence.  So, 
is the antirealist able to avert the above problem in virtue of being an antirealist?  I don’t think 
so.  She may say that logic is not choice independent in that its standards are dependent on the 
logical narrative we develop, but she still must explain why the standards of logic are judgement 
                                                 
42 Scanlon, Thomas. Being Realistic About Reasons. New York: Oxford University Press, 40 
43 Reynolds, Steven. Realism and the Meaning of Real. 40(3) Nous. 
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independent of rationality and yet normatively related to it.  Denying choice independence 
enables to antirealist to say that in some sense it is up to us to make logic normatively related, 
but explaining how this is done is no trivial matter.  In short, the antirealist has a perhaps 
important, available response to the problem that the realist does not, but such response needs 
further development.           
Carnap’s is another view.  It promises to be neither realist nor antirealist.  It is worth 
pausing to see if his view avoids the problem.  On a Carnapian picture, statements make sense 
only after the rules of the language have been laid down, so the truths of logic do not have choice 
independence because they depend on our linguistic rules.  The Carnapian can’t meaningfully 
ask whether there is autonomy between the disciplines because there is no fact of the matter 
outside of some framework, but she can ask if the autonomy obtains relative to some framework.  
And she can ask whether it is convenient to adopt a framework where the two disciplines are 
autonomous.  If she does adopt a framework where they are autonomous, she must explain how, 
in that framework, logic can play a normative role, if it indeed does play a role.  In the end, this 
would be a Carnapian variant of my problem.  In summary, the problem I am raising does well in 
not begging the question against other philosophical views, such as those of realists/anti-realists 
and Carnapians. 
With that clarification of realism/antirealism aside, we can return to the problem that I am 
raising here.  I have been saying that logic and rationality have independent standards of 
correctness and that this is sufficient for autonomy.  Yet, if logic normatively relates to 
reasoning, then we must explain why it does.  This need for an explanation is what I call a 
problem.  This conclusion may seem hasty because of the following four unanswered questions. 
1) Since logic isn’t developed in a vacuum but in the context of human practices, which are norm 
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governed, isn’t it inevitable that it have some normative significance? 2) When we are told that 
there is a problem due to the normativity of logic, what do we mean by “logic” and 
“normativity?” 3) Isn’t the practice of formulating bridge principles simply the explanation of 
how logic can have normative significance? 4) Given that scientific theories can also provide 
normative modals, what makes logic special?  I take up these questions in turn.            
First, there is the historical claim that logic has been developed, at least partly, by 
studying human language, reasoning, and debate—by inevitably norm governed practices.  With 
this sort of origins account, it is hard to imagine how logic could not be norm governed.  The 
case I have in mind for this objection is Aristotle studying natural languages, and developing 
general formulas of what follows from what.  On the account of logic as developed, at least 
partly, in light of norm governed practices, there’s no surprise that it has normative significance.  
This worry is on the right track.  While this might make logic’s normativity less surprising, we 
want an answer to the follow up question of how it manages to be autonomous and yet 
normative.  In section §4, I will give my answer. 
Secondly, the conclusion seems hasty because of the ambiguity of “logic” and 
“normative role.”  Fortunately, I think this can be remedied by expanding on three senses of 
logic and normativity.  Priest44 writes that medieval logicians distinguished between: logica 
docens, logica utens, and logica ens.  Logica docens refers to the logic that is taught.  This has 
varied throughout the years, and Priest divides the history of this logic in terms of ancient, 
medieval, and modern.  Throughout such time, logic docens can go through radical changes.  For 
example, arguments considered valid in one system may not be considered valid in another 
                                                 
44 Priest, Graham. Revising Logic. The Metaphysics of Logic, Edited by Penelope Rush.  
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system.  Aristotelian logic has invalid forms that modern propositional logic holds to be valid, 
such as the multiple generality problem.  On the other hand, logica utens is the logic that we use 
in ordinary reasoning.  This seems to contradict Harman’s point, and the point I have embraced, 
that reasoning isn’t identical to logic, but I don’t think it needs to be contradictory.  A rational 
agent, even if she doesn’t realize it, will typically reasoning according to some policy or policies, 
which can be labeled logic utens.  Harman’s claim is that the logic utens is not logic docens.  
Finally, logica ens is defined in an objective sense as the logic of what actually is valid.  We 
won’t have much use for the logica ens concept in this paper.   
Those are three distinctions in logic and three distinctions in the history of western logic.  
Now, let’s clarify three ways logic can be normative.  Here I borrow terminology from 
Steinberger.45  Normative roles can come in the form of directives, evaluations and appraisals.  
Directives are first personal prescriptions that direct an agent on what he or she should do.  
Evaluations are standards, in an objective sense, by which we determine whether an action is 
good or correct.  Finally, appraisals are statements of praise or blame.  Although there may be 
some overlap between the three, there are important distinctions between them.  When Sally is 
late for work, you let her borrow your bike.  Unfortunately, on her bike to work, she runs into a 
train and dies.  Had she been walking, her only other option, then she would have not run into the 
train and she would be alive.  So, how should we think of your bike lending action?  The action 
seems both wrong and excusable, which seems contradictory.  We take the action to be the 
wrong, yet if we were in those circumstances, we would have recommended bike lending.  The 
above terminology helps make this apparent contradiction intelligible.  As an evaluation, the 
                                                 
45 Steinberger, Florian. Three Ways in Which Logic Might be Normative. Unpublished.  
https://floriansteinberger.weebly.com/uploads/5/7/9/5/57957573/three_ways_jp.pdf 
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action was the wrong thing to do, but evaluations are neither directives nor appraisals.  The basis 
of blame is missing because one did not, and could not, foresee the consequences.  Moreover, if 
asked for advice, one might have even given the directive: let her borrow the bike.  This shows 
that evaluations, directives and appraisals come apart.  A rough classification is as follows.  
Appraisals are the basis for our attributions of praise and blame.  Evaluations are the basis for 
our judgements of actions.  And directives are the basis for agent guidance, i.e., they aim at 
positive evaluations.   
Putting together the terminology presented here, we need to know why a logic docens is 
normative for a logic utens given their autonomy.  Here, for something to be normative, it must 
specify a rule that, when violated or followed, determines a normative outcome in terms of 
evaluations, directives, or appraisals.  
The third question is as follows.  Since to be normative just means to specify the rule 
which serves as a basis for normative assessments, then isn’t the practice of formulating bridge 
principles simply the explanation of how logic can have normative significance?  As we have 
seen, Macfarlane, Field, and Steinberger respond to Harman by developing bridge principles.  
Upon going into detail on what a bridge principle is, we will easily see that there is more to be 
said as to how a bridge principle can be normative.  Now, what exactly are bridge principles?  
And how do they manage to make the connection?  Literal bridges work by connecting material 
from one end to the other such that a person could by supported as he or she goes across.  But 
what material do bridge principles use to make the connections?  And how do they “support” us 
from one side to the other?  It seems that the literal meaning eludes us.  In the previous section, I 
explained how the bridge principles contain facts of logical consequence in the antecedent, called 
the triggering condition, and some normative claim in the consequent.  Perhaps the bridge works 
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when the trigger is always followed by a normative claim that we would accept on the condition 
that the trigger obtains.  
Understood in this way, discovering bridge principles seems analogous to what is going 
on when one is attempting to reach reflective equilibrium (RE).  In RE, one starts with accepted 
judgments about a subject.  If the subject is morality, then one can start with judgments about 
actions that are clearly right and good.  Then, one formulates a principle that captures these 
judgments, i.e., a principle whose application would lead to these judgments.  The likely 
outcome is an unsuccessful principle: it might capture judgments we don’t accept or it might fail 
to capture judgments that we accept.  To achieve a better fit, a decision will have to be made of 
whether one should modify the principle or modify one’s judgements.  The relation is also 
symmetrical.  Just like one’s judgements lead to a principle, the principle can lead to new 
judgements in novel applications.   
I take it that the practice of proposing bridge principles is analogous to the practice of 
reaching RE.  We start with a judgement: agents should believe the implications of their beliefs, 
so we propose the principle of implication: “If A1…An imply B, then an agent ought to believe 
B.”  Then, we notice its unsuccessful because it captures judgements we don’t accept.  Agents 
shouldn’t be expected to believe all the consequences of their beliefs, especially not in cases 
where doing so would be overly demanding.  With these judgments, we might modify the 
principle’s trigger condition to only apply to recognized or obvious implications: “If A1…An 
obviously imply B, then an agent ought to believe B.”  This modification does not make it a 
rational requirement for an agent to believe implications that are overly demanding and thus does 
not entail the unacceptable judgement that agents should believe the overly demanding 
implications of their beliefs.  From the fact that the principle and our judgements are modified 
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through the process of RE, it is evident that the process is normative.  Otherwise, revision of 
one’s judgements would seem to be a distortion. 
Finding bridge principles is akin to the process of reaching RE, and bridge principles are 
normative in that they specify a rule that, when violated or followed, determines a normative 
outcome in terms of evaluations, directives, and appraisals.  However, there is an important 
difference.  The principles arrived at in searching for a sense of justice or morality are principles 
dependent purely on the normative facts.  They are good principles if they are formulated to 
capture what we take to be correct ways of thinking about justice or morality.  The case of logic 
is unlike this case in that logic is already there and it’s not put there to describe our normative 
judgements, yet its suppose to guide them, dictate them, or inform them.  Bridge principles are 
formulated with the intent of capturing or describing what our normative judgements are 
regarding how someone should reason, so there is no mystery as to why they are normative.  But 
what remains unexplained is why logic plays a role in the development of bridge principles.  One 
unsatisfying answer is that this is a coincidence.  We can do better than this, and the next 
sections attempt to. 
The fourth question is, given that scientific theories can also provide norms regarding 
what one should believe, what makes logic special?  This is a challenge asking, “what makes it 
problematic that logic is normative but unproblematic that scientific theories/models are 
normative?”  The response to this challenge is that a scientific theory doesn’t have the autonomy 
or independence from reasoning that logic does.  That is, science does not employ standards of 
correctness (i.e., standards of induction and/inference to the best explanation) that are different 
than what we take rationality to require.  True, science does this in a more careful, sophisticated, 
and technical way, but this still leaves it unproblematic.  Logic does, however, employ rules that 
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are independent of what rational agents use.  Thus, the challenge is met because other sciences 
do not employ rules independent of rationality.   
To summarize, I am saying that the problem is the question, “why are logical facts related 
to rationality?”  It is a question that confronts realists, anti-realists, and (some) Carnapians.  I 
considered three possible issues with the question.  First, one might think that the historical 
origins of logic make sense of its normativity.  I noted that an account of the normativity of logic 
should be consistent with its historical origins while respecting its autonomy.  Secondly, I 
attempted to clarify the notions of “logic” and “normativity” by introducing the terms utens, 
docens, ends, for logic, and evaluations, directives, and appraisals, for normativity.  Finally, as a 
response to the question, one might say that logic relates to rationality via bridge principles.  I 
argue that this still leaves unexplained why logic plays a role in the construction of bridge 
principles.  In the next section, I consider Field’s response to the problem I am raising.       
§3.2 Field’s Account of the Normativity of Logic    
In this section, I want to explore Field’s response to the problem.   In the end, I will judge 
his view as an inadequate solution, but this is not to say that it lacks philosophical rigor or that 
it’s not at all worth considering as an option.  Field46, 47 has recently elaborated a naturalistically 
Kosher account of the normativity of logic.  His aim here differs from the above topics on the 
normativity of logic.  Previously, Field and others were described as attempting, via bridge 
principles, to specify the normative role of logic.  In this section, Field is proposing a foundation 
for terms of normative assessment, terms such as “that conclusion is reasonable” or “that is a 
                                                 
46 Field, H. Pluralism in Logic. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2(2). (2009) 
47 Field, H. Epistemology without metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 143(2), (2009). 
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good norm.”  This relates to our topic because his account allows agents to treat logic as a norm 
while being consistent with the view that logic is independent.  
Normative assessments include ethical judgement, such as a wrong action; they includes 
aesthetic judgements, such as a good painting; and they include judgements of rationality, such 
as a reasonable/justified belief.  Field believes that normative assessments48 are not 
straightforwardly factual in the following sense.  First, they are relative to an assessor’s norms.  
A statement such as “murder is wrong” is true only according to some norm.  Field spends a 
considerable time clarifying how we should understand these relativized statements.  Is this how 
they are ordinarily meant?  If not, is this view revisionary?  How do we understand the normative 
assessments of people who are ignorant of the relativity or who reject it?  Such questions, though 
interesting, need not be addressed here because the points to follow will not depend on how one 
answers.  Now, by ‘norms,’ Field just means policies or preferences.  This makes “norms” a very 
broad category.  It includes statements of the form, “maximize utility,” or “believe the 
consequent when affirming the antecedent.” Secondly, an assessor will have attitudes towards 
the consequences of employing a norm.  Also, there are facts about the consequences of 
following the norm, “maximize utility.”  A likely consequence of following such norm will be an 
overall increase in happiness.  And an agent may have an attitude of approval towards increasing 
happiness.  This will lead to normatively assessing as ‘good’ actions that follow the policy (i.e., 
the norm) “maximize utility.”  A parallel situation obtains in the epistemological situation.  For 
example, an agent will have factual beliefs about what the consequences are when employing a 
counter induction norm: it may lead to bruises, starvation, and slow learning.  She will have an 
                                                 
48 He uses the term “evaluations.” Since I have already used this word in a different way, I will 
use a different word for clarity.  The changes should have no consequence on the meaning.   
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attitude towards such consequences: this is bad.  And hence she will consider it unreasonable to 
follow a counter induction policy.  To summarize, Field believes that following a norm—say 
maximizing utility or one of counter induction—will have some objective outcome.  Perhaps 
maximizing utility leads to greater overall happiness and counter inducing leads to slow learning.  
An agent will have attitudes towards these outcomes; in the case of greater happiness, the 
attitude is that this is good, and in the case of counter induction, the attitude is that this is bad.  
These attitudes are the normative assessments and they are relative because they depend on some 
norm.  It’s this relativity and norm-dependence that Field characterizes as “not straightforwardly 
factual.”  In short, Field’s position has both relativist and expressivist elements. 
Field writes that his views are developed as a response to the standard worries from 
Hume, Mackie, and Benacerraf.  These are the problems of locating normativity in a naturalistic 
world, the problem of having knowledge of normative facts, and the problem of deriving a 
normative fact from some purely descriptive set of facts.  But Field also responds to the problem 
that I have been alluding to.  On his view, logic can be thought of as a policy (i.e., a norm) the 
employment of which will have consequences: to name some, policies may lead to quick 
learning, accurate learning, or slow learning.  As before, one’s attitudes towards the 
consequences of following this policy generates the normative assessments of actions and beliefs 
that are either following the policy or are inconsistent with it.  Earlier, I defined a normative role 
as something that specifies a rule that when violated or followed determines a normative 
assessment.  Since the normative assessments depend on our attitudes towards the outcomes and 
the outcomes depend on the policy (i.e., logic) in question, then logic is playing a normative role.  
On Field’s view, logic isn’t imbued with some mysterious, unexplained normative property.  
Rather, its normativity is generated naturalistically by agents who subjectively evaluate treating 
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logic as a policy.  Importantly, his view also allows for logic to be autonomous since nothing in 
his account requires logic to depend on reasoning or rationality.  Lastly, I said that an account of 
the normativity of logic should include an explanation of the history of logic, where logic isn’t 
developed in a vacuum of abstraction but in the context of language, reasoning, and debate, 
admittedly norm governed practices.  Nothing in Field’s view straightforwardly suggests how 
this condition will be met, but at least his view is prima facie consistent with the historical 
component.  Moreover, in his writing, he never mentions intending to include this historical 
component.  In summary, Field’s theory presents a considerable response to the problem of how 
an autonomous logic can play a normative role for reasoning and rationality.  
What should we say about Field’s view?  Because it has expressivist and relativist 
elements, any good objection to these views is presumably a good objection to his view.  
However, I am interested in the question of whether Field’s view of epistemic rationality reduces 
to instrumental rationality, and whether this reduction is tenable.  To explore this, I will answer 
three questions.  What is instrumental rationality?  Does Field’s view reduce epistemic 
rationality to instrumental rationality?  And why is this reduction untenable?  I take the 
affirmative position on the last two questions and I will answer the three questions in turn.   
§3.3 Field and the Instrumental conception of Epistemic Rationality 
The importation question of this section is a question concerning the distinction, if any, 
between epistemic and instrumental rationality.  Some49 argue that we do not have a clear 
                                                 
49 Cohen, S. Theorizing about the epistemic. Inquiry-An Interdisciplinary Journal Of  
 Philosophy, 59(7-8). (2016). 
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enough concept of “epistemic” to even raise a distinction, while others50 argue for such a 
distinction.  I will argue that we mean different things by each term.   
 As I see it, if there is a distinction between epistemic and instrumental rationality, it must 
be that reasons in the former, but not the latter, are goal independent.  Instrumental rationality, or 
the requirements of instrumental rationality, depend on one’s goals.  To see what constitutes 
instrumental rationality, assume the following obtains.  Bret learns he is in a burning building 
and he does not want to die in it.  Given these conditions, he is rationally required to evacuate as 
efficiently as possible.  For current purposes, we should not quibble over the “efficiently as 
possible” clause.  Perhaps Bret is an acrobat highly trained in circus stunts and would do quite 
well jumping out the window and landing in the trash bin, which happens to be the most efficient 
evacuation route.  Suppose further that, concerning efficiency, a close second evacuation option 
is to walk out the door next to the window, with no more risk than the first option.  By taking the 
second option, Bret doesn’t thereby forsake his instrumental rationality.  But here we are here 
worried only about the general conditions of instrumental rationality, and the precise details 
should be ironed out in a future, complete theory.  Besides points like these, I take it as 
uncontroversial that Bret’s rational requirement is to evacuate as efficiently as possible.   
Now, what is it that generates the instrumental rational requirements?  I extrapolate from 
Bret’s case that the rational requirements are generated by 1) a fact 2) a cognitive relationship to 
that fact and 3) a goal related to that fact.  The rational requirement will be to do that which 
“appropriately51” satisfies that goal.  For Bret, the fact is that there is a fire and such fire puts his 
                                                 
50 Kelly, T. Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique. Philosophy and  
 Phenomenological Research, 66(3). (2003). 
 
51 I leave it to a complete theory to explain what goes into “appropriately” 
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life in danger.  The cognitive relation is his knowledge of that fact, and the goal that Bret has is 
the goal of surviving.  Without these pieces in place, it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
understand why Bret would have reason to escape the building, unless one of the pieces is 
replaced by one of an equal type (maybe there isn’t a fire but he is trying to avoid the police).   
It may seem that there are few counter examples.  First, imagine that Bret only thinks 
there is a Fire, but really there isn’t.  We may not have a fire and thus not a fact and yet still label 
Bret as rationally required to evacuate quickly merely because he believes there is a fire.  
Secondly, suppose that there is a fire, Bret’s goal at any given time is to survive, yet he doesn’t 
know there is a fire.  One might say that Bret has a decisive reason to evacuate despite him not 
meeting the cognitive condition.  Finally, Bret might know of the fire and its harmful proximity 
(thus meeting the first conditions), and yet not have the goal of living.   Someone might say that 
even though he does not have a survival goal, we can still evaluate Bret as irrational for not 
evacuating.  I am not entirely confident that this is a persuasive objection.  I mention it because 
there is something quirky (and hence irrational) about a person who has no goal of surviving, 
perhaps because we evaluate him by the goals we accept.     
 I think these cases point to the need to clarify my three-part account.  Fortunately, this 
can mostly be done by appealing to the easy-to-see distinction between subjective and objective 
rationality.  Subjective rationality is what an agent should do given his available evidence.  
Objective rationality is what an agent should do if he knew all the facts or had what 
epistemologists call ‘total evidence.’  Imagine you find out that 100 miners are drowning in 
location one, two, or both.  Suppose further that you do not know where they are.  In front of you 
are three buttons: A, B, and C.  A saves all the people in location one, B saves all the people in 
location two, and C saves 50 people from each location.  Given that you do not know how the 
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individuals are dispersed, what should you do?  The correct answer seems to be option C, for 
then you do not risk 100 lives.  Now, suppose they actually are all in location two.  So, what 
should you do?  Obviously, one should choose button B.  I take it that what makes sense of these 
conflicting answers is that subjectively, option C is rational, but objectively, option B is the 
rational one.  The benefit of adopting this subjective-objective distinction is that it will allow us 
to make sense of these competing intuitions.   
 Applying this terminology to Bret’s case helps respond to the first two objections.  In the 
case where Bret merely believes there is a fire, he is subjectively required, although not 
objectively required, to evacuate.  In the case where there is a fire but Bret is unaware of it, then 
his subjective rationality permits him not to evacuate, though objectively he should.  This 
suggests a rewriting of my three-part account of instrumental rationality into two forms, one for 
subjectively rational agents and one for objectively rational agents.  Bret is objectively rational in 
evacuating when 1) there is a fire compromising his life, 2) he knows there is a fire, and 3) he 
has the goal of living.  Bret is subjectively rational in evacuating when 1) he has some credence 
in something he takes as a fact (e.g., someone yells “fire,” or the alarm goes off) and 2) he has a 
goal related to the fact (i.e., the goal of not being burned).  This accounts for the first two 
objections to (1) and (2) as criteria for a theory of instrumental rationality.      
The last type of objection evaluates the agent regardless of whether he has a goal or not—
i.e., the objection is that Bret is irrational for not evacuating even if he did not have the goal of 
surviving.  Since this objection does not depend on having or lacking an epistemic state, and 
since the subjective/objective distinction is in terms of having/not having said epistemic state, 
then the subjective/objective distinction will not deal with the last objection.  However, I think 
the objection assumes that there are goals every instrumentally rational agent should have, such 
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as the goal to want to survive.  I think, however, that an agent can decide not to have the goal of 
surviving and still be counted as rational, say if his goal is to die.  We still find him odd, but 
that’s because it’s odd to imagine someone who does not have survival as a goal, and it’s not 
because surviving is somehow an objectively rational goal.  To illustrate the point, imagine that 
Bret’s courageous brother has been taken hostage by a foreign power because of his knowledge 
that is crucial to the downfall of his country.  He is contained and waiting for the master 
manipulators and torturers who never fail and who will come and take the secret by force.  By a 
severe lapse in judgement, the guards left him in a room with a red button that will blow up the 
facility and the interrogators.  His options are either press the button and blow up everything 
with him in it or not press it and risk the safety of the country.  Bret’s brother doesn’t just press 
the button, he crushes it!  I take it that Bret’s brother is rational person despite not having the 
goal of surviving.  Since nothing seems to depend on the conclusion being a survival type of 
goal, I take this to count against the more general objection that in lacking a goal, one can 
nevertheless be irrational.  To be clear, there is a similar objection stating that an agent who has 
literally no goals—not just lacking a single goal—is irrational.  This seems plausible, but it is 
consistent with my view since all I have said is that the instrumental rational requirements are 
generated by goals.  To compare these different objections, I am saying that to count as an 
instrumentally rational agent, one must have some goal, but there is no specific goal that is 
required.              
 That completes my answer to the question, “what is instrumental rationality?”  Of course, 
much more remains to be said.  My goal here was only to give a clear enough picture that could 
meaningfully relate to Field’s account of rationality.  The next task then is to show how Field’s 
view is an instrumental conception of epistemic rationality.  In my above characterization of 
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Field, I did not use the concept of “goals.”  This was excluded for purposes of simplicity, but I 
believe that the concept of goals plays an important role in his epistemology.  He writes, 
“judgments of one norm being better than another are relative to our goals and to our evaluations 
of the possible trade-offs among them… for epistemic norms, the only goals of interest concern 
attaining truth…”52  By “judgments” and “evaluations,” Field just means normative assessments.  
Later, he continues, “we certainly don’t regard all logics as equally good: … relative to almost 
any goals one may have, a logic that allows you to affirm the consequent is a bad logic, in that it 
will have a deleterious effect on achieving those goals.”53  Earlier, I related that for Field, the 
normative assessments were results of the policies we employed and our attitudes towards the 
consequences of employing such norms.  From these quotes, it becomes clear that these attitudes 
are related to some epistemic goal in that the agent is approving of it.  Thus, we will have a 
positive attitude towards those norms that service an epistemic end if employed, and we will lack 
a positive attitude towards those policies that do not serve an epistemic end. 
 Now, notice how this is parallel to my previous characterization of instrumental 
rationality.  We have a fact: policy P has certain property—say, learning truth quickly.  We have 
a cognitive relation: I realize that it does.  And we have a goal: I want obtain truth quickly.  As I 
have argued, instrumental rationality has these three conditions.  And since these conditions are 
sufficient for instrumental rationality, it follows that Field’s epistemology is a kind of 
instrumental rationality.  
 All of this is not to say 1) that field affirms the distinction between epistemic and 
instrumental rationality and 2) that Field agrees that his view is an instrumental conception of 
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53 Ibid., 355 
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rationality.  Indeed, in the texts I have been considering, he is silent on these issues, which is 
why I have argued for these two points.  Perhaps someone could respond to me by saying that 
Field would not agree to construing his account of the norms of assessment as depending on 
goals.  The only textual support I can find for this is a passing comment where he relaxes his 
view: “…saying that our norms are to be evaluated by these and a variety of other ‘truth-
orientated’ criteria is much weaker than saying that we adhere to them because we think they are 
the best means of achieving some tradeoff among those truth-orientated criteria”54  Here, the 
“best means of achieving” portion indicates an explicit denial that epistemic rationality is 
generated in the way that instrumental reasons are generated.  The instrumental reasons we have 
for taking some means or action depend on the goals we have and whether those means best 
serve those goals.  Bret’s reasons for exiting the room depend on his survival-goal and whether 
exiting the room serves this goal.  In the above quote, one may argue, Field is claiming that we 
do not adhere to some norm because it serves some goal and thus is denying that epistemic 
reasons are produced as instrumental reasons are.  
What is missing, unfortunately, is an explanation of how what he is saying is ‘weaker’ 
than saying that our reasons are generated by some goal.  His denial that truth related goals aren’t 
related to why we follow some norm is in stark contrast with his discussion of goals, as seen in 
the previous quotes.  So, I find the statement very puzzling.  Since this remark is made in passing 
without much elaboration, our best interpretive practice is to interpret it in light of the clearer 
passages and in context of the main argument, where he is obviously claiming that the norms are 
assessed by our attitudes toward the outcomes of employing such norms and that we positively 
assess the norms with desired outcomes.  Now, goals are just desired outcomes, so the positive 
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assessments depend on goals, and these goals then generate the reasons for employing this or that 
norm.  I think that Field does mean to give goals the role I say he does.  We should interpret the 
above quote to be consistent with this.  Perhaps what he meant by ‘weaker’ is only that an agent 
doesn’t consciously choose one norm over another because of its service to some truth related 
goal.  Alternatively, Field could mean that the evaluations based on truth-orientated criteria do 
not presuppose that they are the standard of “best-ness.”  Perhaps Field wants to remain neutral 
on how standards of “best-ness,” if any, are ordered.  Is coherence of beliefs better than their 
truth?  Nevertheless, either way that they are ordered, one wouldn’t be denying that epistemic 
goals play a role in generating epistemic reasons, on Field’s account.  Therefore, on the more 
charitable interpretations of Field—i.e., those that show how he is not contradicting himself—
Field isn’t denying what I have argued for: epistemic goals generate epistemic reasons.       
 Now, if I have argued correctly, then Field holds to a sort of instrumental conception of 
epistemic rationality (ICER).  Thus, an objection to ICER should count as an objection to Field, 
all else being equal.  Such an objection naturally comes from the question, “does epistemic 
rationality depend on goals?  Kelly55 has an interesting argument to show that it does not.  
Basically, Kelly says that if epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality (ICER), then what 
we epistemically should believe will depend on our goals (i.e., of finding the truth).  But it 
doesn’t.  Thus, epistemic rationality isn’t instrumental rationality.   
The controversial premise for Kelly’s argument is that epistemic rationality does not 
depend on our goals.  This is how he argues for this point.  Suppose an atheist has no goal in the 
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truth of the belief, “god exists56.”  Then, if ICER is true, upon hearing evidence for the existence 
of God, the atheist will be under no rational obligation to update his beliefs since he has no goal 
in obtaining truth on the matter.  If this seems bad, the situation is worse than this.  On the 
instrumental conception, there are no reasons when there are no goals.  So, the goal-less atheist 
knows, a priori, that there is no reason to believe that God exists without ever having to know his 
opponent’s arguments.  This, however, is absurd, so ICER must be false.  All this suggests that it 
is characteristic of epistemic rationality that epistemic reasons do not depend on one’s goals—
something in contrast to Field’s view. 
 Two versions of objection suggest themselves.  First, there could be tacit goals, such that 
the atheist in the above example really does have the goal of knowing the truth about God’s 
existence and hence is required to update his beliefs according to the evidence.  Well, I discern 
no a priori reason to deny that there could be tacit goals.  But at the same time, I discern no a 
priori reason against the possibility of a person who for a given question has literally no 
epistemic goal and hence no epistemic requirement, given ICER.  And it is this latter, plausible 
possibility that is sufficient for Kelly’s argument to go through.  This brings me the second 
version of the objection.  Perhaps for every agent, S, and each coherent topic, T, S has an (either 
conscious or tacit) epistemic goal with respect to T.  If this were true, then the atheist in the 
above example would have an epistemic obligation to update his belief in light of the evidence 
even if he does not care about the correct answer.  This is because he might not have a conscious 
epistemic goal, but he does have a tacit goal.  Now, notice what this move does.  Goals are no 
longer part of an agent’s personal preferences, as they are usually conceived of in instrumental 
rationality.  Rather, they are objective features of all agents, or epistemic contexts, akin to an 
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Aristotelian telos.  I see no reason—besides that of saving ICER—to grant goals this status.  But 
if we did grant goals this status, then I don’t think we would have an instrumental conception of 
rationality because the existence of goals independent of an agent’s personal preference is 
foreign to the concept of instrumental rationality.  Such a view, whatever it amounts to, is still 
going to generate normativity, but it makes it mysterious why all agents are subject to certain 
epistemic goals. 
What if I am wrong and truth related goals do not generate epistemic reasons on Field’s 
account?  If I am wrong about this, then I am wrong in claiming that his view is an ICER.  But 
the spirit of my critique would still stand because whatever generates the epistemic reasons on 
Field’s view is some agent’s subjective evaluation.  Then, we can reformulate Kelly’s objection 
all over again.  An agent who has no subjective relation towards the truth about P does not 
thereby forgo her epistemic duties.   
 In closing, Field’s view holds much attraction in that it deals with the known issues of 
normativity as well as the one I have motivated here.  Unfortunately, his view faces 
consequences that are difficult to accept.  Next, I will attempt to keep some of the insightful 
aspects of his view without the unacceptable consequences.   
§4. The Logic-as-Model View and Normativity 
I have identified the autonomy of logic and reasoning as a problem.  This section will do 
three things.  First, I present three broad ways logic can relate to reasoning and I argue that one 
such way—the logic as model view—is preferable among the three.  Secondly, I will elaborate 
on the logic as model view.  Lastly, I will turn to an application and assessment of the view, 
where I detail how this view allows logic to play a normative role while also reinterpreting 
Harman-esque objections into something more constructive.   
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§4.1 Three Ways Logic Might Relate to Reasoning  
We have seen that Field provides a response to our problem, but it has the consequence 
of reducing epistemic rationality to instrumental rationality, which in turn had the implausible 
consequence of making epistemic rationality dependent on one’s epistemic goals.  I think there is 
something right about having epistemic goals play a role in the evaluation of logic, and I believe 
that the logic as model view can preserve what is right about goals playing a role without resting 
epistemic rationality on them.  Moreover, when this view is compared to its alternatives, the 
attraction of the view becomes apparent.  Here, I defend this latter claim, and I will subsequently 
defend the former claim that the view preserves from Field what is right about assigning a role to 
epistemic goals. 
The first step is to clarify the sense in which formal and natural languages relate.  One 
view is that the formal language describes the logical form present in natural language sentences.  
Because of the forms, certain sentences combine to make valid arguments such that any 
combination of sentences of the same form will constitute a valid argument.  Let’s call this the 
descriptive view because it views logic as describing features of natural language.  Another 
option advocates regimenting our natural language so that it becomes as explicitly logical as 
possible.  We can refer to this as the normative view since it tells us how we should structure our 
language.  A third option is that the formal language models the natural language.  Such a view is 
exemplified in Shapiro’s Vagueness in Context where he writes. 
The present claim is that a formal language is a mathematical model of a natural language, in 
roughly the same sense as, say, a Turing machine is a model of calculation, a collection of 
point masses is a model of a system of physical objects, and the Bohr construction is a model 
of an atom. In other words, a formal language displays certain features of natural languages, 
or idealizations thereof, while simplifying other features.57  
 
                                                 
57 Shapiro, Stewart. Vagueness in Context. New York: Oxford University Press, 49. 
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Shapiro is saying that a formal language is to natural language what the Bohr model is to the 
atom.  He is also saying that the same relation obtains between logic and reasoning.  How the 
above quote says this needs to be specified, and fortunately, Shapiro does just that.  He begins by 
asking what formal logical symbols have to do with correct reasoning.  
 …what is the medium of (correct) reasoning?  Is it a natural language, a realm of 
propositions, a language of thought, or something else entirely?  Since the notions treated in 
mathematical logic all turn on the syntax and semantics of formal languages, the enterprise 
seems to presuppose that the medium of reasoning has a syntax and a semantics.  That is, the 
medium of reasoning is much like a language.58 
   
Shapiro is saying that reasoning occurs in a language and hence logic, as a formal language, can 
relate to reasoning via its medium, i.e., natural language.  To remain metaphysically neutral, he 
makes the side note that if reasoning occurs in another non-linguistic medium, then logic, in 
virtue of its purely formal nature, does not relate to it. 
 These views have intuitive appeal to them, so how shall we assess them?  The descriptive 
orientation, in my opinion, over intellectualizes natural language.  Although what makes this 
view plausible is that some aspects of logic do correspond to aspects of reasoning in natural 
languages, competent language users don’t reason in ways that logic requires59.  This is the 
lesson we learned from Harman.  Relatedly, the contents of logic extend far beyond what an 
ordinary language user understands without proper training.  The natural language just doesn’t 
have the rigor that formal logic has, and this would be a requirement if it were being described 
by the formal language.  We can label this criticism the over-intellectualizing objection. 
 A different comment can be made for the normative orientation.  It tells us to regiment our 
language to match logic, thus making language’s logical form explicit enough to do science and 
                                                 
58 Ibid., 27 
59 Priest, Graham. Revising Logic. The Metaphysics of Logic, Edited by Penelope Rush.  
 Cambridge University Press 
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metaphysics.  One thing that is eyebrow raising is the suggestion that we should60 regiment our 
language.  One can ask whether this is a good piece of advice.  After all, we have learned from 
Harman that reasoning and logic aren’t identical.  
 The logic as model view contains what is correct about the descriptive orientation.  Namely, 
that there is some correspondence between a natural language and a formal language, but it 
doesn’t hold that every feature of logic corresponds to some feature of natural language.  
Moreover, the logic as model view does not imply an obligation to match one’s language to 
one’s formal language, though it presents a way to do so and an explanation of why doing so 
would be beneficial.61  Each of the three views outlined here are normative in the sense I have 
been using.  That is, they use logic to specify a rule the application of which would lead to a 
normative assessment.  However, the logic as model view is preferable because it avoids the 
over-intellectualization objection and because it explains why goals play a role in choosing a 
logic.  The next step is to clarify what it means to say that logic is a model. 
 §4.2 An Elaboration of the Logic as Model View 
 What does it mean for logic to be a model?  A good way to begin is by explaining what it 
means to be a model.  A model is defined functionally.  That is, it should be defined by the role it 
plays.  And this role includes, but is not limited to, aiding in understanding, predicting, 
controlling, or knowing.  A model of predation can serve the purposes of understanding what is 
happening in an ecological niche, predicting environmental outcomes, or controlling such 
outcomes.  Obviously, these concepts are interdependent and how a model relates to them calls 
for a longer study.  I take it as uncontroversial that a model does relate in these ways, and below 
                                                 
60 What is eyebrow raising is taking the normative view to say that we are obligated to do this.  
The suggesting isn’t as shocking if it’s a mere proposal.   
61 I argue for this in §4.3 
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I will only sketch how this might be done, but the sketch will have enough details for our 
purposes.   
 A model is an idealized theory, and idealization is an intentional distortion or discrepancy.  
Weisberg62 distinguishes three types of idealizations in models, and they depend on the goals or 
reasons for idealizing.  First, a Galilean idealization comes about because the theorist wants to 
simplify the theory or make it computationally tractable.  Secondly, minimalist idealization is 
used to include only the relevant or essential causal factors.  A model of the motion of a ball on a 
frictionless plane and in a vacuum would be one such idealization.  It may be used to illustrate 
that unless acted on by another force, the object would continue in motion.  Finally, multiple 
models idealization includes multiple, incompatible models.  Typically, these are used when 
each model achieves a different goal such that it would be too costly to abandon one or another 
of the models.  This last option isn’t a property of a model per se.  It is rather an explanation of 
why scientists may want to retain incompatible models, namely, to accomplish different goals.  
This will be important when discussing the role of building different logical models.   
 Besides idealization, Models also come with representors and artefacts.  Shapiro63 defines 
representors as those aspects of the model that correspond to the target phenomena and artefacts 
as incidental features of the model that do not correspond to reality.  An elementary school 
science fair contestant may have Styrofoam balls as planets, painted to resemble planets in the 
solar system, and propped up by wooden sticks.  The relation of the balls to each other is a 
representor since it corresponds to the actual relations of planets to each other.  The balls and 
their colors are also representors.  However, the wooden sticks holding up the balls do not 
                                                 
62 Weisberg, Michael. Three Kinds of Idealization. Journal of Philosophy,104(12). (2007). 
63 Shapiro, Stewart. Vagueness in Context. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. 
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correspond to anything.  They are artefacts.  And if a judge criticized the budding young scientist 
by saying that, in reality, planets are not held up by sticks, then the judge would be making an 
erroneous criticism64.  
 One question that arises is “what makes something an artefact?”  The answer cannot be, as 
Shapiro suggests, that artefacts are parts of the model that do not correspond to reality, for then a 
model of a flat earth would be an artefact.  Even though flat earth models fail to correspond to 
reality, we don’t treat them as artefacts.  The scientific criticism levied against this model is of 
the same type that the above judge levies against the aspiring scientist who props up Styrofoam 
balls with sticks.  Yet, in one case this criticism is legitimate, and in the other it is illegitimate.  
What explains the difference is that the criticism is legitimate when the criticized feature of the 
model is a representor, and it is illegitimate when the feature is an artefact.  Our practices here 
indicate that failing to correspond isn’t sufficient for being an artefact, for we criticize 
representors for this very same reason.  
 A better definition is that representors are those aspects of the model that serve some 
theoretical end: prediction, control, or understanding65.  These may be accomplished by a 
correspondence between the model and reality, but they need not be accomplished this way.  The 
Bohr model of the atom does not correspond, but it may aid in understanding the atom, albeit at a 
superficial level.  And artefacts are those features of the model that aren’t meant to play the role 
of a representor.  I wish the situation was as straight forward.  Theorists can discover that some 
aspects of the model that were considered artefactual can be representors.  Not being a 
                                                 
64 One could criticize the student on an aesthetic or innovative level.  Using magnets to hold up 
planets would be far better.  Nevertheless, this is a different sort of criticism even if it’s based on 
the same fact—that sticks were used to prop up planets. 
65 I imagine that there are other theoretical ends besides these.   
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mathematician himself, Einstein took almost a decade to find a mathematical system to express 
his theory of gravity and space-time.  A colleague of his informed him of Riemann’s work in 
geometry, which had been developed in the 19th century.  That is, it was developed prior to 
Einstein’s theory and with no intention for it to apply to Einstein’s work.  This is a common case 
of how developments in mathematics often have unintentional applications in physical theory.  
There are countless other cases. Steiner66 explains how group theory came to play a role in 
fundamental physics.  Physicists Hermann Weyl and his mathematical colleagues were using 
symmetry groups to model fundamental particles.  Since these models added no new physical 
information, the importance of these models was questioned by certain colleagues who referred 
to Weyl and others as “gruppen pest.”  Nevertheless, Heisenberg’s SU(2) symmetry group model 
of the neutron and proton surprisingly turned out to have further group theoretic properties that 
lead to the prediction and discovery of further particles.  The stories of Einstein and Weyl teach 
us that a theorist’s relation to a model is dynamic: models come from unexpected places, and 
what is considered an artefact may become part of the model.  These dynamics, we will see, help 
us understand how the logic-as-model view plays into the topics of this essay.  
 Lastly, to present logic as a model is to answer two questions.  First, what features of logic 
are representors and what are they representors for?  Secondly, which features are artefactual and 
why?  There are no necessarily correct answers here.  As a Styrofoam ball can be a model for an 
atom, planet, or basketball, so too logic can be used to model different phenomena, or when there 
are competing models, they model the same phenomena.  An example in logic is parenthesis; 
they typically aren’t meant to have a counterpart in natural reasoning.  In regards to the second 
                                                 
66 Steiner, Mark. The nature of nature : Examining the role of naturalism in science, Edited by  
 Gordon, Bruce. Dembski, William. ISI Books. Wilmington, Delaware. (2010). 
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question, the answer typically depends on features that the theorist regards as incidental and this 
varies from model to model.  On one solar system model, the artefacts are the sticks that prop up 
the Styrofoam balls, whereas on another—with magnets holding up the balls—it’s the magnets.  
To say that there are no necessarily correct answers is not to say that statements about what a 
rational agent should do are true relative to a model, nor is it to say that these facts somehow 
depend on the model at hand.  A thermometer can be thought of as a model of temperature, and 
there is no such thing as a necessarily correct thermometer—only useful or more useful ones, but 
this doesn’t mean that there are no physical facts about heat or that these facts somehow depend 
on the thermometer.  Similarly, to say that there are no necessarily correct answers regarding 
which parts of the model are representors or artefacts is not to espouse relativism about the facts 
regarding reasoning and rationality.       
 Returning to the view, a complete model answers both of the above questions.  I will not 
formulate a complete model because this is what Shapiro does at book length, nor is it necessary 
that I do so to understand the view.  All that is necessary to understand the view is to give a few 
examples of what counts as an answer to those two questions67.  For example, Shapiro writes 
that, “at the very least, the notion of ‘deductive consequence’ should be a representor.  A 
conclusion in natural language should be deducible from some premises if… the corresponding 
formal argument is deductively valid in the formal system.  Otherwise, it is hard to see how a 
deductive system models anything.”68  Here, Shapiro answers the first question by suggesting 
that deductive consequence in a formal language is a representor of deductive reasoning in 
                                                 
67 I am assuming two things.  One, that understanding what counts as an answer to a question is 
sufficient for understanding the question.  Two, that the examples I give here are enough to 
understand what counts as an answer.   
68 Shapiro, Stewart. Vagueness in Context. New York: Oxford University Press, 51. 
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natural language.  To illustrate, Shapiro might say that an argument in natural language should 
be consistent with the principle of modus ponens and it shouldn’t conclude with the consequent 
by denying the antecedent of a conditional statement.    
 How about the second question—what features are artefacts and why?  One answer, again 
from Shaprio, suggests itself from the observation that formal languages have a precision that is 
utterly foreign to natural languages.  Hence, their high degree of precision can be considered an 
artefactual feature of the logical model.  The option of appealing to artefactual features is what 
enables the logic as model view to avoid the over intellectualization objection.  To summarize, a 
model is defined by the role it plays, such as helping understand some phenomena.  The features 
used to do this are idealization and representation.  Artefacts are incidental features of the model 
not intended to play a theoretical role.  However, the history of science shows that whether a 
feature is considered an artefact can change with new information.      
 §4.3 The Logic as Model View: A Layout, Application, and Analysis 
 §4.3.1 A Layout   
In this section, I apply the logic as model view to solve the problem I have been 
discussing.  I do this by showing that logic can be a model of rationality.  Features of logic 
capture ways to obtain epistemic ends.  Such features, then, can be models of how an agent 
should reason and thus logic normatively relates to our theory of rationality.  But this is a 
“model” only, which means it comes with certain idealization.  What an agent should do will 
also be influenced by factors such as cognitive limitations.  Hence, this view of logic’s normative 
role respects the autonomy of logic and reasoning.  Lastly, I will discuss benefits of solving the 
problem this way as well as implications for the debate between Harman and others.   
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 First, to show that logic is a model is to say which features are representors (and for what) 
and which ones are artifacts.  If logic can be a model for reasoning or rationality, then which of 
its features corresponds to a feature in reasoning or rationality?  Earlier, we saw that Shapiro 
thinks deduction in logic is a representor.  But why should deduction be a representor?  The 
answer, as a general principle, is that a feature of logic can be a representor in a theory of 
reasoning/rationality when it models the route to some epistemic end.  In Shapiro’s case, the end 
is truth since, presumably, he has in mind truth preserving deduction.  But plain truth isn’t the 
only epistemic end: there is finding truth quickly, accurately, or precisely.  Other epistemic ends 
include coherence, intelligibility, and understandability.   
 We can still question why a feature of logic should model the route to some epistemic end 
for it to be related to rationality.  To begin answering, let’s classify three ways logic can be 
conducive to some epistemic end.  First, when E is evidence for P, logic can capture this, say via 
an inductive or probabilistic logic.  Secondly, having beliefs that are coherent/understandable can 
explained by saying they are consistent.  There’s the question of how exactly consistency is 
related to coherence and understandability.  For purposes of space, I won’t take it up.  I just note 
that there are clear ways in which it is related: “I like and I don’t like green tea” seems 
incoherent because its inconsistent.  Ordinary speakers often make statements of this kind and if 
they are pressed for clarity, they respond by showing how their statements are consistent: “I like 
that it has caffeine, but I don’t like the taste.”  Finally, that A non-evidentially implies B can be a 
reason to believe B.  “There are fifteen children there” non-evidentially implies that “there are 
children there.”  I am arguing that logic can explain or map how we get to these various 
epistemic ends and thus logic can be used as a model for rationality.   
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 To elaborate consider the evidential relation.  Prior to some fully developed logic, we have 
some idea of which evidence, E, counts as evidence for P, when it does so, and to what extent.  
For example, if I see a beehive there, then this is evidence that there is honey there.  I also have 
beliefs about the conditions under which seeing a beehive is evidence, such as if I am close 
enough and sober enough.  Finally, I have an idea of the extent to which this is evidence.  I can 
expect beehives to give me honey at a rate that is above chance.  The conclusion, “there is 
probably honey there” is an epistemic end in that it is probably true.  Often enough, evidential 
relations lead to epistemic ends.  A logic can capture an evidential relation and hence can be a 
model for some epistemic end.  
 All of this, however, is not a theory of rationality.  This is because we have further views 
regarding when an epistemic route should be used to evaluate, direct, and appraise an agent.  
This is difficult to see in the honey case because of its simplicity.  What an agent should do in 
this case is difficult to distinguish from what the evidential relation is.  But this isn’t always the 
case.  Our views of when and how an agent should be normatively assessed for following or not 
following a logical rule will be influenced by cognitive limitations.  The truth of A implies an 
infinite number of propositions, most of which are unimportant and uninteresting.  We can’t 
expect a rational agent to whole heartedly follow implication to infinity.  Call this the problem of 
clutter.  Restriction to a finite number of implications isn’t the solution, for suppose that A 
implies B, where A is Peano’s axioms and B is some complex theorem.  An agent can fail to 
make this implication and still count as rational because the implication is overly demanding.  
These restrictions are due to cognitive limitations.  To see this, imagine that the agent in question 
is God, who is omniscient and has infinite time and power.  Then, the problems of clutter and 
over demandingness don’t seem as pressing.  So, in general, our theory of epistemic rationality 
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depends both on the epistemic routes as well as what is feasible for an agent.  Since epistemic 
rationality depends on epistemic routes, and these are captured by a logic, then logic normatively 
relates to rationality.  The representors, therefore, are the principles of cogency, consequence, 
consistency. 
 We have a further question of how such principles relate to each other.  Perhaps they are all 
captured by form and rules of logic such as non-contradiction.  That is, we might say that the 
valid consequences and consistent statements of a logic are a function of the forms the logic 
endorses as valid and the rules of the logic. Hence, on this way of understanding the relationship 
between consequence and consistency on the one hand, and logical form and logical rules on the 
other, the fundamental representors of a logic are the endorsed forms and logical rules, for they 
map out the epistemic routes.     
 §4.3.2 The Application and Analysis 
          Now, that logic is a model for rationality, and that the model can be adjusted to 
accommodate an agent’s cognitive limitations, has two consequences.  First, it teaches us that 
Harman-esque worries are incomplete.  Secondly, and relatedly, Harman-esque worries are 
reinterpreted as epistemological engineering projects—an observation that Steinberger has made.  
Let me elaborate. 
 Recall that we defined representors as those features of the model that serve some theoretical 
end, say predictability or understandability.  So, to the extent that a representor accomplishes 
these goals, to that extent the model is successful.  This means that models are successful in a 
goal dependent fashion.  An objection to a model of theoretical rationality, therefore, should 
show that some goal is not obtained.  That is, it should show how a logical model cannot be used 
in evaluations, directives, or appraisals.  What is incomplete about the Harman-esque objections 
  
59 
is that they don’t show how certain goals, i.e., said normative functions, are unfulfilled.  All they 
do is illustrate that a principle of logic is not necessarily a principle of rationality.    
Harman-esque worries, therefore, should be interpreted as promptings to modify the 
model in a way that better accomplishes one of these goals.  If the model is supposed to provide 
direction, it should be precise enough to be follow-able.  If it is only supposed to be an 
evaluation of an action, then a minimum requirement is that it be applicable to the circumstances 
it aims to evaluate.  This is an insight coming from Steinberger.  His paper explains that there 
isn’t just one normative role to specify, but three different ones, and that Harman’s objections 
can serve as desiderata, depending on the normative role in question.  He writes, “the 
objections… do double duty… later serving as desiderata against which the viability of positive 
accounts… may be tested.”69  Whereas a Harman-esque worry may have inspired skepticism 
about the normativity of logic, the information here calls for a more constructive response.  A 
response akin to epistemological engineering. 
For purposes of illustration, I will provide a few examples.  When building the model, one will 
use the representors, Harman-esque considerations, and the normative function in question.  
Depending on the normative function, one may or may not ignore certain Harman-esque 
considerations.  This is because only some of the normative functions are agent sensitive and 
only some of the Harman-esque considerations depend on agent sensitive concerns.  In specific, 
the normative functions of directives and appraisals are sensitive to the agent’s limitations 
whereas evaluations are not.  Evaluations are just objective descriptions of what is correct or 
incorrect.  Recall that it is wrong for someone to lend his bike if doing so unexpectedly leads to 
                                                 
69 Steinberger, Florian. Three Ways in Which Logic Might be Normative. Unpublished.  
https://floriansteinberger.weebly.com/uploads/5/7/9/5/57957573/three_ways_jp.pdf, 3. 
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the person’s death.  It is wrong—in an evaluative sense—even if one had no way of knowing the 
consequences.  However, the agent may not be blameworthy since we cannot reasonably expect 
him to know the consequences, and not knowing either, we would have recommended, i.e., 
directed, that he lend the bike.  So, suppose that our normative goal is an evaluation.  We 
propose a principle such as “If A implies B, then you ought to believe B.”  We can use this 
principle to evaluate whether an agent has correctly reasoned; that is, he correctly reasons when 
A really implies B and he draws the implication, B, on the basis of A.  Notice that this principle 
should not be affected by objections that consider agent limitations since we are talking here 
only about evaluative functions, so over-demanding and clutter avoidance worriess play no role 
here.  Something that will play a role is agent independent considerations.  For example, one 
shouldn’t draw an implication based on a false belief.  Thus, the above principle needs to be 
adjusted: “If A implies B, then you ought to believe B when A is true.” 
 Notice too that qua evaluation, the principle doesn’t need to factor in what an agent 
believes.  However, this would be relevant if the principle were a directive: “If A implies B, then 
you ought to believe B when acceptably believing A.”  By “acceptably,” I just mean to factor out 
cases where the agent has obvious undefeated reasons for not believing A.  Now, as it stands, this 
principle is not a good enough directive because of other agent relative limitations.  These could 
easily be accommodated.  For example, over-demandingness and clutter avoidance can be met as 
follows: “If A straightforwardly implies B, then you ought to believe B when acceptably 
believing A and when B does not constitute clutter.”  These cases are not the final product, but 
they do exemplify how in building the model, one should take into consideration logical facts, 
the normative aims, and the various Harman-esque/agent considerations that relate to the 
aim/agent sensitivity. 
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 Now, even if its a bit of digression, it is worth pausing to consider how this view compares to 
Field’s, especially since I have given epistemic ends a significant role and I critiqued Field’s 
view for generating epistemic normativity via epistemic goals.  An attraction of Field’s view 
came from the fact that we can evaluate different logics depending on how well they serve 
certain epistemic goals.  I think this is true, and the model view of logic is in line with this.  
Where I argued that Field went astray was in saying that these goals are the bases for epistemic 
normativity.  Suppose that some E is evidence to believe P such that one has an epistemic reason 
to believe P.  Field says that the epistemic reason comes from our approval of the consequences 
of a policy.  In this case, it is a policy that allows us to believe P on the basis of E.  Here, he was 
wrestling with the known metaphysical issues of placing normativity in a naturalistic worldview.  
An alternative account is Scanlon’s.70  He would say that E is a reason to believe P just in case it 
really is a reason, and that is all there is to it.  My account isn’t meant to answer this question.  It 
is consistent with Field’s or Scanlon’s.  What I am trying to settle in this section is the problem 
of explaining how an autonomous discipline of logic can relate normatively to reasoning.  Why 
there is normativity is a different issue.  In short, the logic-as-model view captures the benefits of 
Field’s theory without being committed to the objections that I confront him with. 
 Finally, I am now able to deliver on promises made back in section 3.  Recall, first, that 
when raising the problem how logic relates to rationality given its autonomy, I wondered 
whether the question was easily answered by pointing to its historical origins.  Logic is 
developed in light of norm governed practices, so isn’t it expected to have some normative 
component?  My response was that an account of the normativity of logic should be consistent or 
sensitive to its historicity while respecting logic’s autonomy.  The logic as model view does this.  
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Recall that Shapiro believes that deduction in a formal language is a model for deduction in a 
natural language.  This can be characterized by saying that, on the logic as model view, the 
development of logic is sensitive to norm governed practices in which it is developed.  Also, 
recall that Shapiro believes logic also has features that extend beyond the natural language, 
features such as precision.  This can be characterized by saying that, on the logic as model view, 
logic is autonomous, i.e., it has standards of correctness that do not depend on rationality.   
 The second promise from section 3 was to answer why logic plays a role in building bridge 
principles.  Logic stipulates principles that lead to epistemic ends, such as truth and coherence.  
Its these principles that, qua model, are idealizations of what a rational agent would do.  The 
bridge principles are adjustments (to these principles) based on factors such as cognitive 
limitations and based on the goal at hand, i.e., evaluation, direction, or appraisal. 
Conclusion  
 I began with the with the observation that using logic in the evaluation of argumentation and 
reasoning is inescapable.  Recent literature in the area has struggled with two doubts of whether 
and how logic relates normatively.  Regarding the first issue, I argued that the worry of whether 
logic is normative rests on a misinterpretation of Harman.  His observations were never aimed at 
normativity, and using his style of objections is insufficient for normative skepticism regarding 
logic.  However, his Harman’s lesson stands: the principles of logic are independent of the 
principles of reasoning.  This lead to what I called a new problem concerning normativity.  Why 
do the autonomous principles of logic relate to reasoning?  After wrestling with Field’s view, I 
presented the logic as model view.  Our theory of epistemic rationality is influenced by 1) the 
epistemic routes one could take and 2) our views of when to evaluate, direct, or appraise an agent 
for taking these epistemic routes.  I argued that logic captures these epistemic “routes” and that 
  
63 
logic is best understood as a model for rational agents.  Objections to models, I then argued, are 
relative to some goal since the purpose of a model is to satisfy a theoretical end.  This doesn’t 
imply that epistemic rationality depends on some model or theoretical ends.  However, it does 
suggest a way of thinking about the second worry that Harman ensued—that of how logic relates 
to rationality.  On the logic as model view, this is a question of what we want the model to do for 
us (evaluate, direct, or appraise).  It’s something we can conceive of as “epistemological 
engineering.”  We might end by saying that the consequences of everything I’ve argued for here 
are that Harman’s first worry is met and his second one is redefined as a project rather than a 
problem. 
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